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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The· proper starting point for philosophy has been subject 
for doubt and speculation, for theory and dogmatic assertion, 
and no consensus gentilm1 has resulted. Into an already over-
crowded field I put forwa rd the suggestion that the basic 
problem of a11 is the problem of loneliness, m1ique to each 
individual. 1 
Anyone who has not had a consciousness of this loneliness 
has never gone below the surface of living, but no one has es-
caped its influences. We find ourselves in reality to be iso-
la ted individuals, which, Le.i bniz to the contrary, is not the 
best of possible worlds, if possible means conceivable. It is 
a world full of fascination, full of interest, full of po-
tentialities, full of an infinite multiplicity of details whic 
cry out to be organized, related, unified, at the same time 
maintaining, as if in mockery, the impossibility of any such 
achievement. We are isolated individuals. I t is true that ther 
are others facing the same stupendous dilemma, but we cannot 
1 11 0ut of the experience of being an individual there arises 
the problem of loneliness." Brightman, ML , 215. The key 
to the abbreviations used in the references throughout 
this thesis is to be found in the Bibliography at the 
end. 
1 
even take courage in having the task shared, for they are but 
factors in our individual experience, vn1ich remains an isolated 
unit. 
The solipsist, perhaps, may take the situation passively, 
or he may take the final action which will terminate the whole 
situation, but for others this problem of loneliness must be 
met vvi th action. The individual must force some order into the 
chaos. It is his only means of saving himself from the madness 
of despair. An adjustment must be made to the environment, one 
which is broad in its scope and subtle in its detail, an adjust~ 
ment that is ever developing, never complete. To this adjust-
ment we give the name Personality. 
Some one may say that I am being subjective, that I am 
basing all lmowledge , all science, all philosophy on a transi-
tory emotional mood; but let me ask him if all his objectivity 
is not at bottom but an attempt to get a firm grip on the multi 
plicity that assails him from every side. It is this bringing 
together of the many into the one that we are all striving 
for, and in so doing we are solving the problem of loneliness. 
Vmether we can ever achieve success or not is food for specu-
lation~ It is thought that in the aesthetic experience at its 
height all multiplicity resolves itself into unity. Possibly 
in the realm of social experience two hearts may . so harmonize 
that they do beat as one, and tl1ere can be imrti.ediate u.nder-
standing and confidence. Or we may decide with James that "the 
definitely closed nature of our personal consciousness is 
2 

The main subject of this inquiry is memory. It presents 
a problem of prime importance, for memory is the vital factor 
in consciousness of personal identity, our one firm stronghold 
in a kaleidoscopic world. To this problem, as to every problem, 
there is a t vrofold approach. There is the inquiring, analytic 
research of the scientist and the criticizing, synoptic inter-
pretation of the philosopher. Both approaches are necessa~r . 
Both interpenetrate. This thesis, in a very broad sense, be-
gins scientifically and ends philosophically, but there has 
been no attempt to demarcate rigidly the t wo approaches. Per~ 
haps there should be no such attempt in a philosophical psy-
chology. As Vaughan has observed a t the outset of his Gener a l 
Psychology, HModern psychology ••• has committed a tragic 
error in trying so insistently to separate j_tself from phi-
losophy .nl And to such a category the investigation of memory 
most assuredly belongs. 
1 Vaughan, GP, 13. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DESCRIPTION OF ME~ORY 
In attempting to describe memory as it appears to the 
empirical investigator, one is plunged immediately into dif-
ficulties~ There are the obvious one s of language, a result 
of the fact that different writers use a si..ngle term to desig -
nate different aspects of the subject in hand .. In addition 
there are the difficulties i nvolved in trying to treat ats-
tractly the most concrete and real thing we know, personal ex-
perience. And l astly there is the difficulty of trying to des-
· cribe phenomena only, and not to interpret them. 
At the outset, in the role of a scientist, I accept the 
general postul ates of psychology as set forth by I•~oore; the 
existence of the materi al world, the. existence of co 1scious-
ness, and the i nterrelation of the two. 1 Fevr vrould deny that 
a material world of some kind, however it be understood, 
exists, and that it stands in some kind of a relationship vrith 
what we call mind .. The existence of consciousness has, horfever, 
been seriously denied by the advoca tes of extreme Behaviorism. 
Effective answer to these advoca tes has been mad e by Brightman 
1 Moore, FOP, 162. 
5 
among others.! John Dewey, though he is opposed to aclmowledging 
the 'merely mental,' take s a firm stand against Behavior i sm . 
But unless we start with behavior as more 
than physical, as meaning the sum total of 
life-attitudes and responses of a living-being, 
and takes these attitudes and responses at 
their face value, we shall never be able to dis-
cover the existence and importance of the ner-
vous system as the mechanism of behavior. 2 
Nor does the doctrine receive support from a naturalist whose 
chief study has been the process of evolution. 
I shall have occasion hereafter to urge, as 
against radical behaviourists, that mental guid-
ance of' events counts for progress and betokens 
a kind of relatedness that is effective.3 
The more reasonable and open-minded attitude has been taken by 
Vaughan. 
It is difficult to state what the mind is 
beyond the certainty that consciousness is ex-
perience. Our ignorance upon this metaph~sical 
question Lat the outset of investigation! is 
no excuse for denying the existence of mind •• 4 
In view of these considerations, Moore's postulates seem to be 
non-compromising premises from which to proceed. 
A. Definitions of Memory 
It has been said that philosophy consists in defining terms 
accurately. Certainly for Hegel a complete definition of the Ab-
solute would be both the sum total of philosophy and an unending 
task. The definition of memory is something far less than the 
1 Brightman, ITP, 186. 
2 - Dewey, Art. 1., 510. 
3 Morgan, EE, 20. 
4 Vaughan, GP, 12. 
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definition of the Absolute, yet even in what follows I make no 
pretensions to completeness. Rather do I offer some definitions 
which have been set forth in the ~Titings of certain philosopher 
and psychologists. 
The briefest, and yet in many ways the clearest, definition 
comes from the Boston University Philosophy Seminar Minutes. 
"Memory is .. the experience of recognition! • • awareness of past 
awareness.n2 Bowne defines it as "past events, reproduced as 
they were and temporally located in past experience.n3 Miss 
Calkins would describe it as "accurate, reproductive imagination 
•• ,n4 while Brennan phrases it as "an ability to recall events 
of the past and to identify them as past.n5 Miss Oakeley quotes 
with approval s. Alexander. "In precisely the same sense as I am 
aware of a perceived object when I have before me a sensory ex-
perience, I have a memory when I have before me an experience of 
the past and appropriate it to my personality.n 6 Stern, in the 
first place, defines it simply as "the conditioning of experi-
ence by the past,n7 but later brings in a more genetic emphasis 
when he says that "remembrance is the history of the person and 
his world as experienced.n8 
1 MIN, IV, 738. 
2 Ibid., 733. 
3 Bo~me, IPT, 270. 
4 Calkins, ITP, 210. 
5 Brennan, GP, 240. 
6 Oakeley, SPP, 45. 
7 Stern, GP, 188. 
8 Ibid., 249. 
7 
Bradley vie·~·:s memory as ttan i deal construction of the past by 
which t he present is qualified • but not a mere extension 
of the present . 111 J ames stres ses the aspect of feeling. nRe-
meEibrance is like direct feeling : its object is suffu sed v'!i tb 
a war mth and intimacy to which no object of mere conce · tion 
ever attains . 11 2 A.."Yld l as t ly we have Hoor e saying, "Memory it self 
i s a psychological concept constructed to fill up the gap in 
the phenomenal psychic series , t o explain the recurrence of 
previous experiences, and t o satisfy the demand for continuity 
in the interval, without abandoning psychology f or physiology.~ 
V:!henever ·we turn our though t s invrard, v.re find a series of 
ima.ges. r~~ any of these we recognize as bel onging to our own 
past ex eri-nce · at spec ific points of time, and to tbis abili-
ty to recognize them as such '.'! e give the name of ni r:?mory. There 
is a strong tendency in current thought to substitute verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs for nouns on t e gro~md that processes 
and f unc tions, not entities, are t he proper referents i n hi-
l osophic and scientific di scour se .. V!illl.am J a.mes was one of 
the originators of this tendency .. In the cour se of answering 
the question, nDoes Consciousness Exist?n he says, :r ., .. 5 I 
mean only to deD.y t bat t he word Honsciousne sy stands for an 
entity, but to i ns ist most emphatically that it does stand 
1 Bradl ey, ETH, 356. 
2 J ame s , POP, 239. 
3 lioore, FOP, 226. 
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for a function. "l Dev7ey makes much of the point. 
It is a plausible prediction that if 
there were an interdict placed for a 
generation upon the use of mi1d, matter, 
consciousness as nom1s, and -v~e wer e ob-
liged to employ adjectives an adverbs, 
conscious and consciously, mental and 
ment2ll y, material and · hysically, we 
should find many of our problems much 
· 1 · f · , 9 SliDP l ·leo_ .·v 
And vii th reference to the problem of memory, Vaughan follows 
in th2 same line of thought. 
Thus, by substituting imagining for 
imagination, it becomes apparent that 
recalling and predicting, recognition 
and precoanition, are a 1 forms of 
i mag inint!, 4i 0 
Since memory involves ment al i mages, it is at least 
partially a psychic phenomenon and must be distinguished from 
other mental functions . 
B~ The Location of Memory 
Stern, in a classif ication which is suggestive of the 
stages in a dialectic, would p ace memory "bet·we en insti- ct, 
which is of a generally conservative nature, and intelligence, 
h . ' . . 1 , . t , .1. w lcn lS progresslve y alrec ea- •• 
1 J ames, Art. 1., 478& 
2 Dewey, EN, 75 .. 
3 Vaughan, GP, 376. 
4 Stern, GP, 191. 
• It stands bet'!!een sen-
9 
sation and tbought, betvYeen the concrete and the abs tract ~ c. 
It idealizes perception while makinG thought more realistic,n1 
and Allport fol10'WS him literally in this .12 Eume' s analysis 
led him to locate memory somewhere between sense impressions 
.. . • J-~ ....... 3 and lmagJ.naG.t.Ou, and !Nard concludes that ''analytically regard-
ed, perception , memory, imagination or ideation, shm·r a steady 
advance. 114 
These locations are made with reference to the mental 
images involved in the three processes, and in view of the 
fact that I take up the question of i mages later i n thi s 
thesis, I defer a discussion of criteria by y,-hich the sequence 
may be justified until then. 
C. The Four Stages of the Remembering Process 
We can distinguish four stages in the functioning of 
memory; the original impression, or l earning , retention, re-
call, and recognition .. 5 Although these distinctions are pretty 
generally accepted by psychologists, it is here t hat difficulty 
arises over terminology. The first t wo staggs offer no dif-
ficul ty and can be taken up separately, but vvhen v.re get into 
recall and recognition, we are, if ~e are to stick to these 
terms, right in be middle of the age-old riddle -- vvhich came 
l Stern, GP, 216. 
2 Allport, PER, 556. 
3 Hume, TID~ , Bk~ I, Part I, Sec. III; Part III, Sec. V. 
~ Ward, PP, 179. 
5 Cf. Vaughan, GP, 392. 
10 


night of the dinner party .. You remember novi how you tried to 
keep one ear open to his conversation with a neighboring group 
concerning new plane construction '!vhile you were politely 
lis tening to the latest ailments of your host's elderly and 
failing maiden aunt. 
Now in analyzing this experience, so common and so typical 
shall we say that the first stage was recall and the second 
recognition, following Brennan, 1 M:oore,2 and Vaughan 
Recall is the voluntary revival of a 
past experience, effect ed ~~'hen one rn.em-
ber of an association enables the mind 
to trace the other memher through a de-
finite connecting link of a meaningful 
nature .. 3 · 
- - or shall vve follow Butler and others4 and say tha t the 
i nitial stage was recognition, nan incomplete recall, includ-
ing associations betv;- een the t h i ng recalled and the surrOlmd-
ing circumstances of the former meeting·n5 while the l a ter stage 
was a complete recall, nthe function of a sustained effort.n6 
It is Q~fortunate that this ambiguity of language exists, 
but going beyond it, vve can see that the writers are dis-
1 Brellll.an, GP, 241. 
2 ~aore, FOP, 193. 
3 Vaughan, GP, 417. 
4 Miss Calkins makes recognition an incomplete version of 
memory (FBP, 134) as does Woodworth (PSY, 357). James, 
too, follows tbis terminology, although he is more apt 
to speak of the "sense of familiarity." 
5 Butler and Karwoski, HP, 327. 
6 Ibid., 328. 
13 
tinguishing between a.n experience of having the vague feeling 
of familiarity with an object now i n consciousness and the ex-
perience of having a sharp and definite memory-image of an ob -
ject in our past personal time series to which the present one 
corresponds. It is this second experience ·which I would call 
recognition, leaving recall for the in~ediate stage. It is 
this recognition that is essential for true memory. 
Bergson claims that "the association of a perception with 
a memory is not enough to account for the process of recog-
nition,H1 but his obj ection is based on his whole metaphysics, 
which should be studied in itself before one accepts or rejects 
its i mplicates.2 
1 Bergson, Mlu.l1 , 108. 
2 Bergson 's philosophy creates a special difficulty i n any 
treatment · of the problem of memory. He is too i mportant 
to be omitted, yet he is an enfant terrible among t he long 
established principles of philosophy and psychology, e.g., 
sensation has no extension. It s eems to me that his con-
tribution lies chiefly in the vi gorous protest he makes 
against a scientific age t hat tends to mechanize every-
thing . He throws emphasis where emphasis is needed; he 
asserts the rigbts of the spontaneous and creative as 
a gainst the determined and mechanical. But it is quite 
possible that he is carried away on the rush of hie ~lan 
vital beyond the limits which rational coherence allows. 
I hesitate to pass judgment on such a daring t hinker, 
especially on t h e sole basis of Matter and Memory, but if ' ;· 
I am to quote him in connection with various aspects of 
the memory pr·oblem, I should make some statement as to my 
estimation of his system. These few remarks should, in my 
tentative position, suffice, with the additional one t ha t 
in ensuing quotations the emphasis he throws on the point 
in question and not the truth or falsity of his solution 
will be in order. 
14 
It is possible that nwe can retain vri tbout recognizing 
and recognize without retaining,nl as when we develop a 'com-
pletely new idea' which may later be found in our notes, or 
in paramnesia. But in both cases, there is no recogni tion as 
described above because the object of recognition or retention 
has been practically divorced from its associates. William 
.James points out that ttif we could revive the past without any 
associates, we should exclude the possibility of memory, and 
simply dream that we vvere undergoing the experience as if for 
the first time.n2 
Perhaps recognition is not a broad enough term. Ward says 
that "memory includes recognition; recognition as such does 
'Z 
not include memory," 0 and by this usage would the findings of 
the Seminar be legitimate. He goes on to say that 11 actua l 
reminiscences occur only when the recognition is accompanied 
by a reinstatement of portions of the memory-train that are 
continuous with the previous presentation of what is now re-
cognized.114 
With such a diversity of meanings among the terms used, 
however, I feel that I am taking no special liberty with social 
property when I attach my own meaning to them. The stages of 
the remembering process are clear enough. I shall call them, 
1 MIN, IV, 751. 
2 .James, POP, 657. 
3 Ward, PP, 207. 
4 Ibid. 
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in any following connection, learning, retention, recall, and 
recognition, in that ordering, and say , with Juliet -- provided 
my meaning is quite definite --what's in a namel 
D. The Machinery of the Remembering Process 
(l) Images. Images are the stock-in-trade of memory. On 
the question of imageless thought there has been both study 
and speculation, but aside from whether such exists or not, 
we can at any rate conclude that the vast majority of our 
thinking is. done in pictures. ~~enever we remember something, 
we have a picture of it in our consciousness.l "Faint copies 
of past sensory experiences, called memory-images, are a part 
of everyone's mental life.n2 
The existence of images as a f act , no one can deny. But 
as to what they are, there is much disagreement. The experi-
mental biologist ru1d mechanist, J acques Loeb, published in 
1900 his opinion as to their nature. "This conception [Centres 
of associatioriJ treats the image of memory as if it were some-
thing substantial, i.e., something characterized by mass • . . 
these histological or corpuscular hypotheses of the images 
1 There can, of course, be tonal, olfactory, kinaesthetic, and 
other images as well as the visual ones. The confinement 
to visual pictures is merely a convenience and a conven-
tion. 
2 Butler and Karwoski, HP, 328. 
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of memory must be supplanted by dynamical conceptions.nl By 
inference from this, they were still, possibly at least in 
some epiphenomenal way, mental phenomena, but in 1918 we find 
him writing that "what we call a memory image is not a 'spirit-
ual' but a physical agency.n2 Images are relegated to the 
category of physical things. 
Perhaps not quite so bluntly physi cal, yet akin to it, 
are the views of epistemological panobjectivists. In the histo-
ry of psychology Thomas Reid exemplified this conception of 
images. For him idea and object were one and the same thing; 
they were both object. "In thinking of a centaur, it is actu-
ally the centaur of which we think and not the idea or image 
of. one .. n3 In our own days., Alexander takes a similar position. 
"The object is the i mage, which i s said to be real, non-mental. 
It is strictly parallel to the sensum. There is no room here 
for a difference in kind between sensum and image.n4 
-
But far more v:idely is it held that the i mage is a mental 
phenomenon. The testimony of m1critical thought would so 
classify it, ~~d in~ediate experience would seem to render 
another interpretation artificial~ Among t ho s e, however, who 
1 Loeb, CPB, 277 f. 
2 Loeb, FMT, 167. 
3 Reid, Works , II, 419~ 
4 Edgell, TOM, 95. Cf. Alexander, STD, II, Chapter V. 
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hold that the image is some sort of a mental record of a sense 
perception there is serious disagreement as to what constitute 
the difference between the two. All admit a certain similarity, 
but some maintain a difference in quantity "~Nhile others main-
tain a difference in qualitye 
Bain held that the seat of the sensation and of the image 
were to be regarded as the same, a physiological doctrine 
supporting the theory that the t wo differ in degree and not 
in kind,1 while for Berkeley, in comparison with the ideas of 
sense, the ideas of memory were less strong, a difference of 
degree, but he insisted that neither were the effects of a 
material causee2 It is against this merely quantitative dif-
ference that Bergson makes a protest. 
English ideali·sm consists in finding 
only a difference of degree, and not of 
kind, between the reality of the objects 
perceived and the ideality of the object 
conceived.3 
:Memory is something other than a func-
tion of the brai n, and there is not merely 
a difference of degree, but of kind, be-
tween perception and recollection.4 
• • • for if we make recollection merely 
a weakened perception we misunderstand the 
essential difference between the past and 
1 Bain, SAl, 10 ff. 
2 Berkeley, PHK, 30 and 26. 
3 Ber gson, IvlA.M, 318 . 
4 I bi d., 315 . 
J-8 
the present, we abandon all hope of 
w~derstanding the phenomenon of recog-
nition, and more generally, the mechanism 
of the unconscious.l 
A serious objection to a merely q~~ttitative difference has re -
ceived many concrete illustrative forms. I take one from Stern. 
"Is ari. imagined fortissimo as soft as an heard pianissimo, or 
louder, or softer?"2 This fundamental difficulty has led many 
tu the conclusion that the image and the sensation differ in 
kind. By way of example I take Locke3 and .Tames Mill4 from 
the history of philosophy. The contemporary world would readil 
furnish others. 
But if we should agree that the image is a mental thing 
and that it differs qualitatively from a sense- impression, 
there still is the question as to the nature of this differ-
ence. Butler gives a clue to this difference. 
Images are copies of past perceptions, 
not of past sense-impressions • • • The 
memory-image • • • does not include de-
tails vn1ich were not attended to, that is, 
which were not perceived in the original 
presentation.5 
1 Bergson, J;iiA.T\.1:~ :. 71. 
2 Stern, GP, 215. 
3 Locke, EHU, Bk . II, Ch~ X, 2g 
4 Cf. Edgell, TOM, 69. 
5 Butler and Karwoski, HP, 328 f. Vlhile the cases of eidetic 
imagery may seem to disprove this statement, I think that 
such cases are data for physiology rather than psychology 
Since the period of retention is so very brief, the in-
stances of such vivid memory are probably due to laws of 
optics rather than to the normal memory processes. 
19 
Impression conveys the idea of something stamped from without 
on a passive subject, while perception connotes an interaction 
between subject and object. This subjective qualification of 
the impression is what constitutes the difference for Bergson. 
n • • • sensations, far from being the materials from which 
the image is 1-n•ought, will appear • • • as the impurity which 
is introduced into it, being that part of our o~n body which 
we project into all others.nl But for him, sensation has ex-
tension, a doctrine with quite radical consequences.2 Vaughan 
recognizes the activity of mind in the creation of memory 
images .. 
Remembering is not a simple redupli -
cation of a pattern (traces), but a con-
structive imagining through which past 
experi~nce is transfigured to meet the 
present need. Memory transforms ideas. 
An idea is not ·a simple revival of a 
· definitely perceived thing, but the pro-
duct of many perceptions and of their 
subjective elaborations by the perceiver.3 
In Stern the transformation from sense-impression t o image is 
effected by means of its integration within the experience of 
a personal subject. 
The image belongs to oneself in a dif-
ferent sense from a perception that is 
forced upon the individual by the situa-
tion; it does not become so sharply sali-
ent among the other contents and processes 
of the person, but is more or less deeply 
embedded in them, and is able, by reason 
l Bergson, ~~, 312. 
2 Ibid., 180 ff. 
3 Vaughan, GP, 417f. 
20 
of its definiteness, to enact a quite 
different role in the multiform and 
constro~tly changing activity of the 
person.l 
.And it is this account which we should accept:J I believe, of 
the difference in kind between our mental images and our sense 
perceptions. For analytical purposes we isolate the single 
image, but it is necessary to bear in mind that actually 
there is no such thing as a 'single' 
isolated image. All imaginal content is 
present only in broader and narrower con-
nections from which it develops, 'Ni thin 
which it becomes embedded, and through 
which it is transformed in combinations 
and fusions, serial processes, partitions 
and repressions, etcv2 
Images are not committed to the limits of the phenomenal 
space world - - nwe have the power, as we well know, to give 
what size we like to a mental image when projecting it spatial-
nor are they bound by the phenomenal time series. It 
is true that memory-images maintain their own ordered series 
within the personal consciousness, but the person has, poten-
tially at least, command over the whole past span, and through 
imagination, an option on the future. 
The permanent existence of images is a difficult question. 
James, to pick just one from many psychologists, disbelieves 
it. "A permanently existing 'idea' or 'Vorstellungt which make s 
1 St ern, GP, 216~ 
2 Ibid., 219. 
3 James, POP, 236. 
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differ from sensations only in degree arose from observation 
of after-images. The four phenomena listed in the heading of 
this section, with the possible exception of recurrent sensa-
tions, do not belong under the heading of memory as we ordin-
arily think of the term, but they are so closely related that 
modern sychologists have made a subdivision of the main ce.te-
gory, and now consider these occurrences a:s instances of bound 
or primary memory, while those mental events vrhich go through 
the four stages described above are reserved for secondary 
memory .. Stern describes this new subdivision briefly. 11 I mmedi-
ate memory is the ·· ersistence of an experience in the mind 
a-fter the cessation of the external stimulus.nl 
The after-sensat i on is a commonplace experience to anyon 
who has ever concentrated on work with the eyes, particularly 
if the work involved color, both in its positiYe and negative 
forms. The negative prints, invariably appearing in psychology 
text books, are always on the most oft opened page, for every-
on likes to try them, to see 11if it really works", (could we 
make a case for pragmatism a s an instinct) but its CJ.ctue.l 
analysis is not so vrell lmov.n. ·ward points out a significant 
characteri stic VIhen he says that 11 the after image •• ~ is •• 
more elementary than either the preceding percept or its image. 
In both th se , in the case of sight, objects appear in space 
1 Stern, GP, 200. He discusses bound memory on 206 ff . 
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its coldness, the smell of baked beans a foretaste of their 
savour. Such prepercepts differ from free ideas just as after-
percepts do; they are still sense-bound and sense-sustained.nl 
For James, the significance of these psychic. occurrences is 
physiological. "An object of primary memory is never lost. It is 
still in the specious present. The haunting of consciousness b,y 
the impression • • • shows that profound rearrangement and slow .. 
settlings into a new equilibrium are going on in the neural sub-
stance, and they form the transition to that more peculiar and 
proper phenomenon of memory.n2 Morgan sees in them correlated 
persistences of the physical and mental aspects of an organism -
Under correlation, then, primary retention, 
which perhaps may be regarded as the pivotal 
concept in memory, is the persistent go of a : 
psychical system and involves R.n equally per-
sistent go of neural process ori the plane of 
vitality.3 
in which the mental aspect is as important as the physical. 
There is, I believe, a felt quality or guale 
of "passingawayness." This affords the primary 
mark of the past.4. 
stern uses them to add weight to his doctrine of personal dispo-
sitions. "The significance to the perso:n of bound memory is 
above all genetic, involving the history of the person; any men-
tal present for the individual is charged with his entire mental 
past.n5 
Without doubt all of these men are at least partially right 
1 Ward, PP, 186. 
2 James, POP, 647. 
3 Morgan, EE, 133. 
4 Ibid., 145. 
5 Stern, GP, 210. 
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in their conclusions, but it is well to postpone evaluation of 
primary memory until the mind-body problem in its relation to 
memory has been investigated. 
(3) Association. Concern here is with association as a des-
cription of the remembering process, not as an explanation of it 
Stern defines it briefly. "Association is a relation of items in 
the mind of such a nature that the - appearance of one of them in-
volves the readiness to arouse another.nl In all unintentional 
learning the relationship between the items is accidental and 
often quite irrational. In deliberate learning, on- the other 
hand, the person wishing to memorize something tries conscien-
tiously to associate and connect the t hings to be learned with 
as many and diverse other things as is possible. The connection 
will be the more certain as it is more logical and rational. 
The develo.pment of the laws of association is an outgrowth 
of the psychological principle of partial identity in the stimu-
lus-response phenomenon, a principle stating that after a comple 
stimulus has .. called forth a certain response, any part of the 
complex will tend to call forth the whole response. Thus we can 
describe the mechanism involved in memory py saying that wheneve, 
a stimulus excites a conscious response, it will tend to call 
forth those responses which were associated with it. A single 
stimulus may start off a string of associations that go on in-
definitely, branching out on all sides as one response becomes 
in its turn the stimulus for a different response. Such mental 
1 Stern, GP, 221. 
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does occur where that are no, or slight, inhibitory factors, as 
in both day and night dreaming. 
Association involves no ·necessity. It would be more ac-
curate to speak og the principle of association rather than the 
laws of association, for t hen one would be merely stating that 
we do associate objects without implying that there is any par-
ticular system behind the association. The general principle 
involves frequency, intensity, interest, and recency as indi-
cated in the process of learning. 
(4) Mental Set. A fourth factor in the machinery of the re-
membering process is one which is receiving increasing emphasis 
in modern psychology. We find the conception in Bowne. 
The tendency of experience is to give the 
mental nature a fixed set, which, when once 
established, can only with difficulty, if at 
all, be changed. Settled associations of thought 
and feeling flow in certain channels. Such a 
total mental cast represents the person's char-
~cter, and it tends to fixedness of permanence.! 
Vaughan illustrates it in a figure of speech. "Each of us has th 
windows of his house built for him b,y experience, and we can loo 
at life through no other casements."2 Stern's whole psychology 
necessitates and lays emphasis on this factor of mental set, al-
though he is more apt to call it personal disposition. 
The inclusion of this factor in the study of the mental 
process of remembering represents, I think, the whole modern 
1 Bowne, IPT, 279. 
2 Vaughan, GP, 353. 
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The practically cognized present is no 
lmife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a cer-
tain breadth of its own on v-:hich vJ e sit 
perched, and from whi9h we look in t wo 
directions into time.-
The contents of this continuously chang-
ing 'specious' line simultaneously repre-
sents a portion of the real line of object-
ive succession, viz. the immediate past a s 
still present in primary memory-images, 
and the imrnediate future as anticipated in 
prepercepts and nascent acts; its position 
or date being the actual present.2 
By allowing us to grasp · in a _single .in-
tuition multiple moments of duration, it 
~emort7 frees us from the movement of the 
flow of things, that is to say, from the 
rhythm of necessity.3 
It is said that this duation, this specious present, can last 
as long as twelve seconds, and because, standing still in ob-
j ective time, so to speak, vre can observe change, our possibili 
ties for lmowledge and underst anding are extended tremendously. 
This fact of the specious present affor~a satisfactory 
account of the false feeling of familiarity which we all of 
us have from time to time experienced in the presence of some-
thing actually new and strangeG 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the study of the 
specious present lies in its i mplications of a self, but such 
implications bel ong to the field of interpretation, not thit 
of description .. 
1 James, POP, 609. 
2 Ward, PP, 214. 
3 Bergson, MMJI, 303 .. 
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E. The Cultivation of Memory 
(1) Memory Improvement. That the capacity to remember 
is a characteristic which exists in widely varying degrees 
among different persons is obvious to even the most casual 
observer, and when the question as to whether or not persons 
with poor memory can bring this capacity up to a par '.Vi th 
those who have excellent memory, the answer VJhich experimental 
psychology gives is a virtual no. 
-The retentive pmii:er of the mind, since 
it is the f unc tional correlat e of structural 
changes in the brain, is determined by an 
inherited plasticity of nerve t issues. No 
amount of effort or training or culture can 
bring about any improvement in this retentive-
ness . Once ·laid down in the germ plasm, it 
is fixed for the lifetime of that individual$1 
We can accurately speak of the machj_nery of remembering , since 
this power, or possibility of retention is limited by physio-
logical conditions, limits which cannot be overcome. Bowne, 
Miss Calkins, James, and Woodworth -are all in essential agree-
ment on this point.2 
But to say that one's power of retentiveness ·has insur-
mountable limits is not to say that persons with poor memory 
must resign themselves to a life of less rich experience. The 
capacity for retentiveness can be improved up to its limits. 
1 Butler and Karwoski, BP, 336.. . 
2 Miss Calkins quotes James (POP, 663 f~) in ITP, 217. Wood-
worth takes the point up in PSY, 360, and Bo·wne i n IPT, 
276 .. 
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It can t e i ade to function at top efficiency and this through 
careful training in the mnemonic devi ces of learning, all of 
which reduce themselves to means for gaining clear, penetrat-
ing, and meaningful first i mpressions. 
(2) Transfer of Training. This particular question is of 
more i mportance for practice than for theory, but since it has 
bearing on the general problem of association, it deserves 
mention here .. As in the case of memory improvement, so in the 
case of transfer of training are the experim~ntal psychologists 
in essential agreement that it is practically non-existent. 
Allport,l Butler, 2 Vaughan,3 and Woodworth4 concluie t hat at 
least there is but a slight overlapping where memory develop-
ment in one field improves that in another field in which the 
material to be learned is very similar~ Intens e training in a 
particular field -.vill tend to sharpen up one's methods of ob-
servation and thus vdll function as an agent in pushing one's 
capacity for retention up to its physiological limits. Thus on 
this general theory do many educators require a period of 
scientific laboratory work in t he program of all students .. But 
unless this method of observation becomes a part of one's 
1 Allport, PER, 267. 
2 Butler and Karwoski, HP, 338. 
3 Vaughan, GP, 413v 
4 Wood·worth, PSY, 361. 
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mental set -- a by no means common occurrence -- the habi t of 
careful scrutiny will be restricted to t he particular field 
in which it is learned, and any transfer of training is neg-
ligible. 
(3) Forgetting~ No survey of the possibilities of improv-
ing memory, however brief it may be, is- complete without a 
consideration of forgetting. Time and time again facts which 
-v ere learned most carefully elude recall. Occasionaly th..is 
is cause for distress, but for the most part it is a matter 
of indifference. James1 and Stern2 and Vaughan 11 The wise 
person does not attempt to remember everything he sees or 
hear s. Encyclopedic learning may be a burden rather than an 
advantagen3 - - find in forgetting .;1 positive value ~ Because 
consciousness is cleared of the many small details which one 
accumulates, it is open to new impressions. 
This value in forgetting is a practical, not an ideal, 
one however. An ideal situation would be one in which all of 
our experience was available to us, and from a consideration 
of this point, one comes to the question of \N·hether forgetting 
is actually real, of whether in truth we really ever forget 
anything .. 
1 James, POP, 680. 
2 Stern, GP, 245. 
3 Vaughan, GP, 394 . 
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According to Stern "forgetting is complete i'ihen the con-
tent and connection of what has been learned can no longer be 
recovered, "1 and in everyday life we find I!L ny examples of 
such complete losss On the other side, psychology books are 
fill ed 17dth case histories in whi ch subjects, under hypnotic 
or some other influence, recall things long since completely 
forgotten in the common usage of the term. Freud has put so 
much v>Ieight and pressure on this second aspect of nmemic life 
that other psychologists tend to ignore it altogether. They 
claim that it is a dogmatic assertion to say that nothing is 
ever forgotten, but it can be charged vd th as much justifica-
tion t hat it is a dogmatic assertion to say t hat some t hings 
.§£.g_ fo rgotten .. Where the line between things remembered and 
things forgotten is so difficult to draw, one can a t best but 
hold that probably some things are forgotten, a probability 
that can never be ver ified as a fact. The experiments of Eb-
binghaus prove that less time is involved in learning something 
once knovrr1 than in learning something entirely new, a con-
clusion to indicate that forgetting is not absolute, but the 
evidenc at present, and the extreme difficulties in dealing 
with potentialities, which is the proper fi eld for investigatio 
are such as to ·ward one against plunging headlong into general-
ized conclusions~ 
1 Stern, GP, 245 . 
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CHAPTER III 
S01'lli PROBLEI-58 RELATED TO M:EM:OHY 
A. The Concept of 1fueme 
It was Semon who first made an extension of t he phenomena 
of memory such as would include a larger area than t hat which 
we ordinarily t hink of as constituting psychic life and con-
sciousness .. He states his case in t he preface to The Mneme. 
lt would have been strange if philosophers 
and naturalists bad not been struck by t he 
simi l arity existing between the r eproduction 
in offsp ing of the shape and other char acter-
isti cs of parent organisms, and that other 
kind of reproduction ·which we call memory .. 1 
He then, through t he chapters that f ollow, attempts to demon-
strate hoYr t he past i s accumulated and built up through the 
principle of mnemic causality. Starting with an irritabl e sub-
stanc e in a primary state of indiffel~enc e , be shows that v1hen 
excited by a stimulus, this substanc e villl under go a change in 
which it acquires an engram .. When the excitation subsi des, t he 
substance then rests in a state of secondary indifference ~ If 
some part of the original sti mulus again excites -the irri t able 
substance, the engram will bring forth the ent ire original re -
sponse, the respons e in v;bich i t was acquired . This process is 
1 Semon, Jlli~E, 9. 
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lmov.m as ecphory. But Semon notices that stimuli and their 
correlative responses occur seldom; if ever, singlye Rather do 
they occur in complexes, in which a number of stimuli excite 
the irritable substance either simultaneously or in rapid sue-
cession .. Thus tbere is some slight modification of the simple 
engram-ecphory process~ He explains that any of tbe factors in 
such a complex can act engraphically or ecphorically on the 
irritable substance by the princi ple of homophony. 
Now what do we get out of this analysis besides some new 
and impressive words ? The principle is identical with the psy-
chological concept of partial identity as previously described 
under the heading Association, but _where there it is a very 
general description of an event that is so common as to be 
ignored in everyday life, here perhaps it is traced back to a 
specific physiological basis. 
Semon feels that the most important f actor in this nmemic 
process is the change •:thich takes place in the irritable sub-
stance. 
The point we wish to emphasize is t hat the 
irritabl-e substance in the secondary state of 
indifference, as compared with it in its pri-
mary state of indifference, has undergone a 
change, or, as we say, has been influenc ed 
engraphically.l 
It has acquired engrams which are definitely mat erial, not 
metaphysical .2 But if we try to find out more about these 
1 Semon, MNE, 43 .. 
2 Ibid., 275. 
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engrams, we are left with only vague ansv;rer s, or even evasions 
of ansv..-ers. 
It is mo st probable that the engram-stock 
may be encompassed by something smaller than 
the cell or even the nucleus of the cell .. 'He 
called t he most minute morphological Qnit en-
circling it a mnemic protomer, but made no 
attempt at any precise morphological delinea-
tion of this Qnit.l 
In the end we find Semon admit t ing t hat 
Without doubt, excitation is at bottom a 
physico-chemical process and nothing else, 
and the engram simply a residual physico~ 
chemical modification. 2 
It seems, then, that for all his t echnical . language, Semon has 
neither simplified nor clarified the analysis of memory. The 
most one can say from his teaching is that every organism i s 
somehow changed, after it has been excited by a stimulus, in 
such a vvay that it will be able to react more readily to re-
excitation by a stimulus t bat is the same as the previous one, 
or at least partially the same , whenever it occurs again .. 
I vwul d not say, however, that Semon has made no contribu-
tion to the understanding of the memory problem. Vague as his 
theory may be in detail, it calls attention to the physiologi-
cal processes involved in memory and shows how learning, reten-
tion, and recall may apply to all life . Many recognize the 
wider conception .. "Memory o .. .. is subordinate to the still 
1 Semon, IvTiifE, 207 .. 
2 -Ibid., 194. 
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wider concept 'mneme,' which signies the conditioning by the pas 
of all life.ul 11 The capacity for retention is found throughout 
the realm of matter.n2 
Although in the general concept of Mneme the essential stage 
and character~. stic of human memory is lacking 
Conscious memory, in contra-st · to unconsci.ous 
memory, is characterized primarily by the experi-
ence of 'againness' which we designate as reco~­
nition. Psychological memory involves meaning.u 
There may be againness in the renewal of vital 
processes like those that have occurred in the 
organism before; but felt againness is something 
supervenient. It is a mark, orie of the most note-
worthy marlrs, of the emergent quality of con-
sciousness.4 
-- or at any rate neglected -- as Ward says, "in that Lmemori7 
there is necessarily some contrast of past and present, whereas 
here f_f.n retentivenes~ there is simply the persistence of the 
old"5 - - still there is much to be gained by an understanding of 
the three preceding stages. 
A clear understanding of the mind necessitates 
a recognition of the distinction between conscious 
or psychological memory and unconscious or physio-
logical memory. Though physiological memory shades 
imperceptrbly into psychological memory, neverthe-
less, accurate description demands the appreciation 
of some differentiation.6 
We should keep in mind that "important as purpose is in the 
1 Stern, GP, 188. 
2 Vaughan., GP, 396. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Morgan, EE, 126. 
5 Ward, PP, 81. 
6 Vaughan, GP, 395!. 
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situation without apparently having learned how. Because we know 
that after trial and error, we can remember how to make the necesi-
sary adjustments, we are led to speculate on whether a living 
organism making the correct adjustment the first '. time it meets a 
new situation is ·doing so by means of some memory which it had 
inherited from its forebears. 
Now if we are going to consider heredity, we must think in 
physical terms. It is virtually impossible to conceive of an 
offspring's inheriting an idea from its parent. At least there 
is no evidence or ground for the conception. The conditions whicb 
are capable of giving rise to a similar idea may be passed doV'm 
to the next generation, but the contents of the mind, in so f ar 
as they are admitted to be different from physical things, are of 
necessity the exclusive property of the individual being. Literalr 
ly speaking we can neither exchange our ideas nor will them to 
our childre~. As Morgan sees it: 
There is germinal continuity in parents and 
offspring: but there is no such continuity of 
parental and daughter neurones; for neurones 
die without issue. Nor is there continuity of 
parental and daughter consciousness. In each 
generation consciousness is a newly emergent 
quality.l 
But if the organism has to undergo a physical modification in 
order to be able to produce a certain response -- leaving aside 
the question- as to whether this response is recognized or not--
when restimulated b.Y a similar situation, then there is excellent 
reason to suppose that the offspring may be born with that whicb 
1 Morgan, EE, 139. 
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t _he parent had acquired, and tha t the necessary stimulus vdll 
cause him to react 'instinctively'. 
Semon claims that 11 the great majority of the dispositions 
inherited by organisms are to be regarded as engrams,n1 but as 
long as he admits that basically these engrams are merely 're -
sidual physico-chemical modifications', he cannot explain in-
stinct by them, but will have to go all the way with Loeb, 
who says that 
the theory of tropisms is a t the same time 
the theory of instincts if due consideration 
is given to the role of hormones in producing 
certain tropisms and suppressing others. 2 
If mind plays no part in the creation of engrams, if they are 
only instances of physico-chemical activity , then we can speak 
neither of instincts nor of any type of involuntary behavior 
as effects of mnemic causation. Chemical reactions are elicited 
by very definite stimuli, and not by the fragmentary ones which 
Semon claims are characteristic of the mnemic phenomenon. 
It is significant to note that instinct is invariably con-
nacted with physical action. VIe may have an instinct to do 
something, but we never conce ive, for example, of an instinct 
to think clearly. There is the possibility of a dualism here, 
and characteristically, Bergson takes full advantage of it. 
He feels that memory has t wo forms. 
1 Semon, NINE, 68. 
2 Loeb, FMT, 163. 
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• • • the past appears indeed to be stored up 
• ~ • m1der two extreme forms: on the one hand, 
motor mechanisms which makes use of it; on the 
other, personal memory-images vrhich picture all 
past events with their outline, their colour, 
and their place in time.l 
For him habit a._nd matter go hand in hand, or rather, I should 
say, they hold bac1r, hand in band, the forward surge of the 
~lan vital .. That which is instinctive stands opposed to that 
which is spontaneous, that v1hich is old against that ·~,, hich is 
new. "Instinct tends to be unconscious t hrough the fac t that 
its knovdedge is a perfect adaptation translated instantly into 
actionen2 
Habit and instinct are both forms of involuntary behavior. 
The one we thinl-c of as individually acquired, the other as i -
herited from a progenitor ' s habit stock. As forms of behavior 
they are physical and can be passed dm;m through the physical 
organism. Habits can be usually traced back to their causes, 
b t in the case of instincts, the causes may lie in past hi-
story obscure or even 1...mava.ilable. J ane s Mill felt that nto 
appeal to instinct is simply to confess our failure i n tracing 
the phenomena Of mind to the grand COmprehensi V ·8 princi nle of 
association .. n3 He i s un just in . so far as the causes lie out-
side the time span of the individual-in-ques tion's life span, 
and yet he is justified in that 11 lmmvledge itself also con-
1 Bergson, I·fAM, 102. 
2 li\'eber and Perry, HOP, 575 .. 
3 Rogers, ~A , 57. 
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In this same line of thought is the vi ew which Morgan's evolu-
tionary perspective affords him. 
Such instinctive forms of behaviour are, how-
ever, themselves the outcome of prolonged evo-
lutionary advance. To the individual at birth 
they are new in his sentient experience. But 
they are old in the history of the ascent of 
mind. We have, therefore, to reckon with the 
"occurrence" of that which is individually new 
as itself the "recurrence" of that which is 
racially old.l 
To sum up this discussion: it seems that an instinct, regard 
ed as a physical involuntary behavior response, can be intel-
ligibly interpreted as an inherited habit, or, since habit is 
really a memory functioning automa ti.cally, an inherited memory. 
Although the absence of recognition excludes instinct from the 
realm of psychological memory, it may still fall under the gene-
ral principle of mnemic causality. 
c. Consciousness 
(1) General Considerations. To define consciousness is pro-
bably the most difficult problem any t hinker or writer has ever 
tried to face. All that one can say is t hat consciousness is 
consciousness, for any predicates that might be concocted would 
be but a less direct way of saying the same thing. Vaughan has 
given expression to the difficulty. 
It is difficult to state just what con-
sciousness is because it is intangible, but 
J_ Mason, GD, 130. 
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the top-level there are modes of effective 
relatedness which are not present at t he mid-
level; at the mid-level there are modes of 
relatedness which are not present at the bot-
tom level.l 
There is much of the spirit of Hegel in this interpretation. The 
distinctions between matter, life, and mind are essentially thos~ 
betvvwen universal, particular, and individual. There is more of 
the Hegelian method in Morgan's applying his threefold scheme 
to the interpretation of the evolution within mind itself. 
He begins with consciousness as an emergent from the organic 
world. "Consciousness ••• is a quality of the person as cor-
related mind and body~n2 On the level of merely organic life 
the organism reacts to its environment blindly and -unknowingly. 
It is entirely a case of physical stimulus-response. As con-
sciousness emerges, however, the organism is able to bring to 
a. problematic environment the remembrance of his prior efforts 
at coping with it. There arises a mind to direct t he body in 
its adaptations. "He profits bf what he had then learnt. And 
that is the characterizing feature which affords the most dis-
tinctive mark of conscious procedure. n3 The newly~l:>.Prn mind then 
enters into a process of evolving -in which, from a simple sensa-
tion, it .,develops, through perception, into reflection, both of 
which are genuine emergents. "There is in reflection something 
more than ther~ is in perception; and in perception something 
more than there is in sensation. u4 
1 Morgan, EE, 22. 
2 Ibid., 52. 
3 Mason, GD, 121. 
4 Ibid., 119. 
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Of vital importance to Morgan's interpretation is the forwar 
emphasis as well as the backward, the ·concept of dependence as 
well as thw concept of involution to use his terms. Every phase 
of the evolutionary process depends for its functional rela-
tions on what lies ahead of it as much as it ~nvolves what has 
gone before. Thus does he say of the three functions of -mind: 
But, at the level of contemplative thought, 
how perception runs its course depends on the 
guidance of reflective consciousness, so far as 
co-existent; and ~ what is given in sensory 
presentation takes form depends on the guidance 
of perception, if that level has been reached. 
One cannot, therefore, accept the old adage: 
Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu; 
if this means that there is nothing more in 
thought than there is in na!ve perception, and 
nothing more in this than is primarily given 
to sense:r-
Whether one accept his theory or not, and he is the first to . 
call attention to its unprovable. basis --
I am not ~atisfied that its L,t:he ppysical 
world' s7 ex~stence can irrefragabl.y be e·sta-
blishea subject to the search-light of modern 
philosophical criticism.2 
I regard the independent existence of such 
a physical world in its o~m right as not sus-
ceptible of proof under rigid philosophical 
criticism. Hence I accept it under what I speak 
of as acknowledgment.3 
-- nevertheless it does throw light on what consciousness does 
for and means to the conscious individual. And it is only in re 
lation to an individual that consciousness has any mean~g 
whatever. 
1 Morgan, EE, 18. 
2 Ibid., 33 . 
3 Ibid., 24. 
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There is one thing that is characteristic of all conscious-
ness. As many and as diverse as its contents are, they are all 
~.Consciousness must be some sort of unity. There must be a 
certain oneness that can know, remember, compare, speculate 
about its origin, be a common center for all the many contents 
whi.ch flow through it. A subject may not be empirically dis-
coverable by analysis of the stream of consciousness. Analysis 
reveals only a string of associated ideas.l Yet a subject must 
be posited if any sense is to be made out of them. 
The unity of consciousness cannot be ade-
quately asserted on the merely a priori basis; 
much less can it be adequately denied on the 
merely empirical basis. Its nature can be tmder-
stood only when the t wo aspects are seen in 
their dialectical unity and their antinomy is 
thus solved.2 
Consciousness successfully combines the one and the many. It is 
"a moving whole • • • empirically complex, but metaphysically 
simple, on account of its unity.n3 
Loeb equates consciousness with associative memory. "Those 
phenomena which the metaphysician calls consciousness 
1 The most famous putting of t h .s dilemma is that of Hume. 
"When I turn my reflection on myself, I can never perceive 
this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I 
ever perceive anything but the perceptions. It is the com-
position of these, therefore, which forms the self." THN, 
Appendix. 
2 Brightman, Art. 1, 74. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
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are a function of the mechanism of associative rnemory.nl He 
defines associative memory as follo·ws: 
:&J associative memory I mean the tvw fol-
lowing peculiarities of our central nervous 
system: First, that processes which occur 
there leave an impression or a trace by which 
they can be reproduced even under different 
circumstances than those under which they 
originated ••• The second peculiarity is 
that t wo prQ.cesses which leave traces simulta-
neously or in quick succession will leave 
traces which fuse together, so that if later 
one of the processes is repeated, the other 
will necessarily be repeated alsoG2 
The physical mechanisms involved in memory have been discussed 
in general in the preceding materialu The relationship of 
physiological processes to consciousness remains yet to be 
taken up in detail. But this much may be said now. The meta-
physician_, as vrell as the scientist, must respect these 
physiological processes. It may well be true that associative 
memo!"J (and hence, for Loeb, consciousness) "depends upon a 
physical mechru1ism which must be just as definite as, for 
example, the dioptrical apparatus of our eye, n3 and t:b ..at nthe 
mechanism of associative memory can only begin to function afte 
the brain has reached a certain stage of development ••• that 
• only certain animals are provided with the mechanism .. .. 
necessary for associa ti"Ve memory . n4 
But these are the causes of consciousness, not its es-
sence. Loeb virtually admits that there is something mor e to 
1 Loeb, CPB, 250~ 
2 Ibid .. , 213. 
3 Ibid .. , 251 • 
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consciousness than associative memory when he says that nv·rhile 
these animals wi thout doubt possess associative memory they 
possess little 'intelligence' .nl This 'intelligence', \~rhat-
ever it may be, is a phenomenon akin to ' what the metapbysici-
an calls a conscious process'. 
To describe the causae of consciousness, in terms of as-
sociative memory or of some ot her process, may be a valuable 
aid to the ~1nderstru~ding of its esse, but it is not to des-
cribe at the same time this esse. 
Memory is an essential constituent of all consciousness, 
but it is not the whole of it~ Rather is the relationship one 
of part to whole, inseparable, it is true, but not identical. 
(2) Self-consciousness and the Self. To be self-con-
scious is to be consci ous, but it also is something more. As 
Ladd points out 11 being conscious and being self-conscious, 
even if a trace of the latter be involved in every kno~n case 
of the former, a re not identical processes.11 2 Hege l ordered 
consciousness and self-consciousness as advancing stages of 
the dialectic, corresponding to the Sein and Wesen levels of 
his Logic. The following quotation comes from Ladd, but it 
mi ght easily be taken for one from Hegel's Phenomenology. 
1 
2 
Loeb, CPB, 226 .. 
Ladd, POK, 117 .. 
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The further advance of this concernment may 
be described as reason becoming more self-con-
scious in the way of bringing to its own recog-
nition what is implicate in consciousness as 
objective.l 
He defines it thus. "Self-consciousness it the experience of a 
being with itself.n2 The question arises here as to whether any 
t hing new is added by the use of the term expertence, or whether 
the statement merely says that self-consciousness is the con-
sciousness of a being with itself. Ward feels that something nev 
is added. 11Experience is wider than knowledge; hence the inap-
propriateness of consciousness as a name for it, a term strictl 
denoting only knowledge, and~ mediate knowledge.n3 But 
while there are grounds for a distinction, it is one that makes 
for more confusion than clarity. Conscious experience does in-
clude much more than those organizations of data which are 
measured by some criterion of truth and are called knowledge. 
Yet every possible item of experience is known in some sense, 
and further the existence of purely immediate knowledge is a 
h;ighly questionable hypothesis. There is much of Dewey's polemi 
against the spectator theory of knowledge in the statement of 
Morgan that: 
In no sense i .s the mind merely a spectator, 
viewing things as they are in themselves through 
a highly evolved instrument. It is a participa-
tor, in accordance with its evolutionary status, 
in making the world what it 1s.4 
1 Ladd, POK, 18. 
2 Ibid., 198. 
3 Ward, PP, 378f. 
4 Morgan, EE, 48. 
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Although it is unlikely that a self-conscious individual could 
have sensation that was entirely ~ree from perception and re-
flection, using Morgan's distinctions, he might have perception 
with a minimum, if not a complete absence, of reflection, and 
the difference between the experience of perception alone and 
of perception plus reflection ~ight be taken as a difference 
between intuition and knowledge, between experience and con-
sciousness. Still, the former experience is a conscious process 
it is an interaction of mind and body, and so it would seem 
better to equate experience and consciousness and to speak of 
the distinctions, wherever they arise, as instances of vaguer 
or clearer consciousnesses. 
Consciousness of self is a result of the inhere~t unity 
of consciousness, of the fact that it comes in Gestalten. But 
this unity, as was pointed out previously, is a dialectical 
one, the synthesis of a single subject and a multiplicity of 
objects. The analyst sees only the multiplicit,y. 
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permanency. It was memory that made :possible the endurance of 
the self throughout change. As a concrete fact of experience 
we YJ.1.0VJ that we can acquire lm owledge, and if v:e look into the 
proce s s whereby we acquire it, we see tha t a good part of know 
ing wha t a thing is rests in lmoVIing what it is not. We learn 
by comparison .. Nmv the act of comparison requires one f actor 
to be constant. There mus t be a single judge to do the compar -
ing, and this judge is the self., Within the i mmedi ate empirica 
situation the datmn self, as judge, might make a compar ison 
and reach a decision without calling memory into play at all . 
This, I think, is what Bradley meant ·when he wrote that nto be 
a self does not imply ·what is called memory .. ul But V·ihen we 
compare a single object in hand with remembered images of 
similar or contrasting objects, a compl ex situation novr and 
one in the past, or objects or situations both in the past 
all three of which we do every day - - then do we require a 
self that has memor-,Y and life beyond the limits of the speciou v· 
present. V!ere otlr lives naught but a string of disconnected 
datum selves, it vwudd never occur t o us to wonder about a 
self, either enduring or perishing from moment to moment , but 
we do so wonder, and so we must seek for some l ar ger conce tio 
of t he self. According to Bovme, TTMemory i nvolves a c onsc i ous -
n es s of temporal rel ation s beb-'een certain elements of experi-
1 Bradley, ETR, 362~ 
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ence; and this consciousness falls asunder v.ri thout t -le uni t-.1 
a· d identity of the subject. n1 Vie can, I think, ace - t Bradley s 
stat8ment so l ong as \'i:e think only of the datum self, ut v:e 
must loo;: further for a .efi:li tion t, at vd 1 satisfy th 
l arger needs. 
To obtain such a definitio we must certainly leave the 
bounds of science and enter the realm of m~ta·l1ysics, ut 
where necessity urges one on, there is no holding bac 1~ .. ''The 
conce·· t of this larger sel f is psychologically a product of 
thought, not a datura of sense .. n2 I n thinking about the con-
cept of self, one is aware that the many datum selves, each 
a whole in itself, are related in a rational way~ Eacl pre-
sent self can not only remember the past but can anticipate 
also the futur • The indi 1.ridu.al units in the stream _ink to-
get er to form a l arger w-hole, and in this larger whole we 
find the d fini tion of self for v:hich \'Ye were seel~ing: Th 
v1hol s " _f (in contrast to th datum self) is "an i t rpreted 
or inferred whole as linked by m mory, anticipation, a ~­
r ason, with tJe past and future i mmediate wloles .. n3 
One vmuld not expect to find this concept o self pr -
s nt in yonng persons 1Nhose limited e perience h a not ye 
provided them v:ith sufficient materia to d duce it, a d as 
a matter of fact "in the young child the consciousness of self 
1 Bo~·me, IPT, 29. 
2 Ward,. PP, 363n .. 
3 Brightman, Art~ 1, 71. 
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goal e.t a 1, but mer ly an .inunediate objective~ Th y: ise 
cour e is to proceed on V!hat Kar l Groos has called ractical 
a sol utism and theor tical relativism. I t is th s lf ~ho 
directs his urpose tov:ard t 1e maxi mur..r1 valu s of Y:hich his 
knovrledge enables him to conceive , aiKl the self, who, ;'hl e 
maintaining this purpos , seek~ to develop knov:ledge v- 1.:.c'1 
will further clarify and strengthen it, who is v.rorthy to bear 
Vihatev r dignity me.y be assoc iated vd th the soul and v.rba t -r r 
satisfaction ma.y e associa. ted· with the me. tur and rich 
mind .. 
t ast one o h r point should be made before leaving 
the discussion of s lf and consciousness of self, n.am ly, that 
which concerns the subject-object relation ship in experienc • 
Always, in knowing, it is somebody that knmvs something $ Hovr-
ver the subject and object be interpreted, either pistemo-
logically or metaphy sically, t hey are experienced as being 
distinct and sepe.rable ~ V!e can deny this only vri th difficulty 
for the nature of every object of my 
cognition is such thatj as obj ct, i t 
refuses to be identified with·my subjective 
condition; it will not be described as my 
sensation, or m:y tl:ought, merel y; or as 
mere appearance to r!le, e.s only · henomenon .. 
J e.mes call s attention to the fac t that neach of us dichoto-
mizes the Kosmos in a different place LJnto the H.e and the 
not 11;;;? 1' 2 and it is through such a di c 1otamiz a tion that our 
Ladd, PO. , 115. 
2 ames, POP, 2. 0 . 

served seems to be different from the self that is observing, 
and this is the basis on which the distinction between the I 
and the lVIe is made. As many times as this self-observation 
occurs, so many different sel ves are related to one self vrho 
observes them all g The I is experienced as an endurLng thing. 
The Me's are experienced as changing, growing, molded things. 
It is such an experience that has given rise to theories of 
the soul, the pure Ego, etc., in contrast to the surface and 
appare tly contingent modifications v1bich belong to the 
empirical selves~ .P.ny attempt to e:&al t tbe one above the 
other, to save the one by denying the other, in any way to 
change their natural relationship of interacting -.arts of an 
organic whole, i s doomed to f a ilure. It must never be f or-
gotten that 11 the I which has the experience LJ3e it of the 
· Me, or of any other hypothetical entity is the vrho e con-
sciousness which contains the particul ar experience of vJhich 
1 
we spea~." 
The distinction between t e t v!O aspects- of self is 
necessary if not ultimately real. Thi s variety vrithin u..n.ity 
makes self-knowledge possible. \Yard mak s the relationship 
very clear .. 
The I is known reflectively in the Me 
because the Me has been synthetically con-
structed by it, much as an artist paints his 
own portrait by means of a mirror . The mirror 
1 l~TN, IV, 744 . 
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1 
ses. TT 
ecogni tion is the essence of true mE:r!lory ~ I t is not 
-noug _ t J.a t a past event be revived in the consciousne s s of the 
individua l. B.e must identify the present consch:usn~ss as 
corr s pending to -u- i ff erent f om the past event it se l fa 
T .ere are no t~o i d ent ical moments in the 
life o a self~ A consciousnes 3 which coul 
ex erience tv.'o identical rr..orr,en ts v:ould b e. 
c nsciousness wi thol t rLemo -~- . I t v.'ould di 
and be orn again contin1al Y~ T1us th only 
r eal continuity is t1at of mer.or 52 
I n term of th natural t i me se ies \','0 i n c ompat i bles mus t 
brought toge t her i n the present moment that tb y may be j dged . 
But ace rding to Brad ey, 
1 -c is by a 1 ap through i deal ir .entity that 
v: me.ke o rs l ves one •.dt_, Ylhat is incompe.tibl e 
wit_ the resent, and, this dif · e e1ce eing 
t er ~ connected b- a s ries v-.dt J o ~ ·, resent: 
v:e have our past~ Yrhic is~ thus giv n both as 
sund red and a s connected .~ 
and this calls attention to a f Ret vJhicb Stern has o s erved, 
that TT wi t in memory the ersonal orc~er of time is siiHIJ y re-
verse .. "4 Time marches on , and t1e human s l f marches v-:ith it, 
ut not alvm s abreas t .. Someti mes, through antici ation , it 
darts ahead to see if it can find out v'l':~e..t is coming .. Somet i me s 
t hr ough memory, it dashes back to h ave another l ool':: 2.+ som- -
tbing it passed on the v·.a • And a ll these litt l e side-excur-
sions do not c au se it to l ose any time, for they are made v·!i th-
1 
2 
3 
Edgell, TOM, 151 . My 
Leighton , FOP, 311. 
Bradl ey, ETR, 359 . 
italics. 
70 
~~~~=-~S~t~e~r~n~'=G~-~P4,~2~~~- 9~·~===============-=-==~--~~-~=-=-=-=-==~~~=====-============~=====~===== 
in t he limits of th specious r esent . 
This figure suffers, as do many analogies, by illustrat-
:ng only one aspect of the concept referred to, an - erha· s 
misrepresenting it . Thehuman sel f , rather than as a very 
energetic and curi ous compani on of Time on i ts one-vJay as sage, 
might be thoug_ t of as a J an s t raveling a l ong the tim --ath 
and seeing all at once, although with differ i ng degrees of 
cl arity, the past, pr esent, and fut ure . 
Against the patent fact of the one time or der, cl amped 
down from above as it were, stands the ability of the human 
mind to mani pul ate t i me at will . Agains t the cl aim of men 
like lJewton that t i me is absolutE~ sta.nds the clai m of E:instein 
that as th essential result of his t _eory of relativity "the 
l ast rema i nder of physical objectivity i s t aken from space and 
time.nl Time is something of the nat re of mind, and yet is 
objective to f i nite minds .. I t i s both m.any and one in number, 
and from suggestions contained in the probl em itsel f Leighton 
formulates a pos sible synthesi s. 
But since time :> evolut i on, and hisoory are 
real, there must be, underneath a_l finite 
temporal rocesses, an objective and 1.miversal 
time- or-der,. which sustains, includes, and un i -
fi es the infinite multi tude of fini te t i me-
orders ~ •• God ' s life ~ •• is the I nfinite 
Present , the uni versal Now ••• God is now, 
as alv~·ays ,~~ t he Universal Self .2 
1 Cassirer , SF, 356 . 
2 Lei g Jton, FOP , 339. 
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Ther is a · uestion as to vihether our lmowledge of time 
and change is a rational inference or an immediately experi-
enced intuition, and it is on this point that Bercrson comes 
to tbe fore more than enyv.There else., 
It is this rich continuity of eing, 
throbbing through each individual~ which 
constitutes true duration. In the attempt 
to disc~iminate and classify, to se arate 
by analysis this or that feature as character-
istic of this or that moment of life, we 
have lost t he flow of true duration, and 
substituted for i t a series of successive 
states, each in itself static.l 
[in the language of FullerJ •Ne must sub-
stitute the 'real duration' in whose sparkl-
i ng waters we splash and swim for the clock-
time on whose dead current we are helplessly 
carried .. 2 
Devrey makes note of the arti.ficiali ty or instrumente.li ty of 
measured time in contrast to the actua_ continu~rrn of reality. 
Generalized measures of temporal sequences 
(such as are designated by the words second, 
minute, hour, day, year, century , period, 
epoch) stand for l:inds of cycles vrhich, like 
all measures, are procedural means of further-
ing and directing the inclusions-exc lusions 
(affirmations-negations) by which determinate 
subject-matter of propositions is instituted . 3 
Now there is much of value in the emphasis which Bergson throws 
onto this question .. The difference between ex eriencing and 
be i ng conscious of (that is knowing) enter s in as an i mportant 
factor .. Ward recognizes the difference when he says that 
1 Edgell, TOM, 119. 
2 Fuller, HOP, 589. 
3 Dewey, LOG, 222. 
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respective domains. 
To suppose that without the past we should have 
an intelligible present seems obviously absurd.l 
Continuous occupation with impressions can give 
us no knowledge of the present as present. This 
we first obtain when our present consciousness 
consists partly of memories, or partly of expec-
tations.2 
For it is indispensable to note that a limiting 
reference to both past and future is present in 
every existential proposition. There is a refer-
ence to a limit ab quo and ad quem. Without 
this limitation, a change is not characterized 
or qualified. No mere flux can be noted, apprais-
ed, or estimated.~ 
For me the past is no more; the future is not 
yet; and their marks characterise now-events, 
affording data for reference to a conceptual 
scheme of the past and the future no less pre-
sent in the mind. Then, and not till then, can 
one speak of a date.4 
.. 
Time and change have been called the great riddles of the 
Universe. I do not presume to think that I have clarified their 
mystery in ·these few pages. What I have been trying to do is to 
indicate wherein the solution must lie, if one there be. Any 
solution which will be adequate must be formulated in terms of 
a self, the one thing we know that can, through memory and anti-
cipation, ~ranscend time at will, that can experience time in 
its intension as well as know it in its extension, and that can, 
figuratively speaking, through the means of the specious present 
stop time in its forward march and grasp the immediate empirical 
situation, with all its change, as a single whole. 
1 Bradley, ETR, 384. 
2 Ward, PP, 210. 
S .. Dewey, LOG,- 221. 
A 111r~ .... - ,.,.. "[;1"[;1 , AQ 
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(4) The Mi nd and the Body. At the outset of this thesis 
I accepted as fact the existence of mind and matter and their 
interaction. VJhatever their essence may be in the last jl.Idg-
ment of metaphysics, it remains an empirical fact that ·we ex-
perience, that we are conscious of, mind and matter as quali-
tatively distinct forms of being~ To be able to accept this 
empirical fact is to be freed both from extreme Behaviorism 
or any other materialism which denies consciousness altogether 
and from any poss ible idealism which might explain body right 
out of the phenomenal -vmrld -- and nThere is danger of an 
idealist giving the impression of believing we wal k around 
without a brain, only being conscious."l As for interaction, 
it seems like an a lmost necessary corollary v.rhen one admits 
the t wo forms of existence. It is conceivable, of course, 
that the tvm move along in complete independence or in merely 
parallel series, but neither hypothesis is a likely one. 
Descartes was forced to modify his theory and 'discover' the 
pineal gland through which mind could affect the body, and 
both the man on the street, who wor ries himself sic1c over 
something, and the scientist · in the l aboratory, v1ho . controls 
experiments by his mental hypotheses, will testify that there 
is an. influence at work between mind and matter~ The amount 
of i nfluence which mind has over matter on the epiphenomenalis 
theory is minute, if existence at all, but the.se epiphenomenal 
1 IFI N, I V, 751. 
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of neural pathways, or what y ou will, and in the process of 
r emembering, one might expect that brain played a part of 
pr ime i n1portance. There are those who would say that it is 
everything. They point out hoVi sensation s and perceptions 
leave cells in the brain or paths of activity in the nervous 
system which need onl y be restimul ated in order to call forth 
a response. In short, they make t he brain the thinker and 
thin.."k that they are telling the whole story. But J ames rer:linds 
us that "if a brain cor ld grasp itself and be self- conscious, 
it would be conscious of itself a s a brain, 111 a decisive 
answer also for those upholders of t he double-aspect t heory 
of parallelism who claim, a~s Brightman describes it, that 
. "IDY brain is really mind, apprehended by the senses; or that 
my mind is r eally my brain, experienced from within.n2 
The problem ofinteraction is gi ven a most i nteresting 
treatment by Bergson~ It might be said that he changes Berkel-
ey's ~is percipi into esse is agere, since perception 
for him spells action . ~ d it is in the active perception 
that mind and matter find a meeting pl ace. 
If we take perception in its concrete 
form, as a ~Jnthesis of pure memory and 
pure perception, that is to say of mind 
and matter, ~we compress within its narrow-
est limits the problem of the union of 
soul and body~3 
1 J ames, POP, 343. 
2 Brightm~n, ITP, 203. 
3 Bergson, Mill~I, 325. 
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Our perceptions are Q~doubtedly inter-
laced with memories, and inversely, a 
memory .. .. • only becomes actual by borrovr-
ing the body of some perception into which 
it slips .... 1 
.. .. • and it is memor-.r above all that l f:inds 
to perception its subj ective characterv 2 
As fo r the specific role of the brain .in this hypothesis, 
.. • • the brain exactly corresponds to the 
perception. It is neither its cause, nor its 
effect, nor in any sense its duplicate; it 
merely continues it, the percep~: ion being 
our virtual act ion and the cerebral state 
our action a lready begun .. 3 
The state of the brain continues the re-
membrance ; it gives a hold on the present 
by t1e materiality which it confers upon it~4 
Bergson's treatment of the relationship between miJ.d and 
body is tremendously interesting and doubtlessly valuable for 
/ 
the mphasis which it throws on the conativa process s, but 
it al so affords difficulties. In the first pl ace the inter-
action between consciousness and the brain is too one-sided .. 
That the brain functions as a translator of thought into 
action seems eyident enougl . When for example, I see a pin on 
the floor, the sight of it rushes through the organs of sense 
perception to my brainvnel~e it arrives as a thought V'!hich 
the brain i mn1edi ately translates into terms of a~propriate 
1 
2 
3' 
4 
Bergson, I•lAM, 
Ibid., 80 .. 
Ibi d.,, 309 .. 
I bid.,, 320. 
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action .. The brain sends out the proper nerve currents v.rhi ch 
control my physical coordination, and I am then able to stop 
dovm and pick it up - - hoping t hat for the rest of the day 
I'll have good luck .. The brain has served very efficiently to 
malce my virtual action an actual one, but has it served per-
haps too well? It enabled me to pick up the pin, but v:here 
did the idea of consequent good luch: come from? Even though 
I don't ut any stock in :i. t, since I can remember many pin-
picking-ups v;hich were fol _owed by no special good f ortune, 
yet I alv..rays associate t h e idea of luck with the piclcing up 
of a pin. Although this association occurs in my c onsciousnes 
it must have at one time been an action in my cerebrum, and 
if such is the case, then it '-'"Ould seem that the cerebr um was 
reviving that previous action and sending it out v:i th the 
one demanded at that moment .. Thus ·while consciousness dictate 
to the brain vvhat it shall do, the b r ain may still have s ome-
th ng to say to consciousness. It i s a difficult task to 
f it a brain into a scheme of thin gs 'Nhere perception is 
pbysicalu So, too, is it difficult to conceive of memory 
images, which to us are as mental as anything could be, slip-
i ng l n ~nd out )f t,he bodies of ;erceptions, which are 
physical . But n.·J st of all, a:s Miss Edgell has said, TTdespi te 
the stress laid upon -::>erception as a ction, 'I'Z"e are bou.nd to 
regard it as being also, or rather as being in the first 
=--~=--=-=~~=-==-=-==-=-=-=-=--=--=-=·-============-===-=--===-=-..:.==::·-------~-
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place, knowing. n1 In a 'iilorld that is ever struggling between 
t 1e onward rush of the elan vi t a l and the baclwvard drag of 
materialized habit, action must of necessity be the watchwordQ 
Yet even here doing and knowing ·what to do are presupposed by 
kno-wing and knowing what t here is to be done .. Conation re-
quires cognition, even as experience requires consciousness, 
to be intelligible .. Perc,eption, be it physical or mental, 
must have a speculative as well as a practical intereste 
James showed how the brain could not be the thinker: In 
Bergson the bra in got mixed up vd t h deeper metaphysical prin-
ciples. It seems as though there should be some connect i on 
between thought and brain functions that is nearer the empiri-
cal surface. At any rate there must be a connection somewhere. 
Descartes had tried in va:i.n to divorce the physical and mental 
functions of man, but, as Ward says, "Both sensation and memo 
• e ~ belong to man only as a rational animal, not to man as 
conceived as intellectus uurus .. n2 
The experimental biologists have accumulated a body of 
information about brain structure and function through their 
work with animals whose brains had been removed or paralyzed, 
or in some other way prohibited from fm1ctioning normally, and 
through their study of human beings with injured, defective, 
1 Edgell, TOM, 130 .. 
2 Ward, PP, 10 .. 
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or diseased brains~ As a result of their studi.es it ha s · een 
os sible to map out the bra in into f airly definite areas which 
correlate with spec ific bodily f unc tions. Such area s a lways 
correlate with physical motor res onses, however, and are no 
bas i s for any i nna.te f aculty psyc ology. Allport feels that 
Gall made as. cor.tri but ion to the under standing of human be i ngs 
when he showed that mind and body are not two independent 
en.titie s but are inextricably related,l but Loeb reject s Gall' 
work in toto . 
This peculi ar hybrid Lfaculties of the 
brai!.!Y betvveen metap:1ysics and anato J owe s 
its origi largely to Gal • Gall was an in-
dustrious worker in the anatorrw of the brain 
and at the same time a huge fraud. The ana-
tomy of the br ain was not sufficiently sen-
sationcl for him, so he enlivened things 
somewhat by grafting upon his anatomy the 
worst metaphy si cs he could possibly get hold 
of . The various nooks and cor ner s of the 
prain became the seat of soul- powers of his 
i nvention . This artificial co~nection be-
t ween metaphysics and brain anatomy or 
histology bas si1ce become tradi tiona .2 
Phrenol ogy, se.ve to a l imited public which is always eager to 
have its for tune t old, has l ost cas te a s a fi eld for research 
i n the study of the brain-consciousness relationship, and its 
f ate is deser ved, for not only do t _e ' bumps' on the sku 1 and 
the shape of the brain have no co nectionwith the ment al 
power of the incH vidual, but even "t e ma s s o the cerebrum, 
1 A: lport, PER, 80. 
2 Loeb, CPB, 277m. 
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unless it falls below a certain minj_mum, in no way affects the 
degree of intelligence."1 As for the ant,ttomy of the bra in it-
self, it is an organ located in and occupying most of the 
skull. The largest portion of it is composed of t wo connec t ed 
hemispheres, built u:p out of layers of nervous tissues, the 
outermost ones of 'Hhich are gray and are knov[ as the cortex , 
or the so- called gr ay -matter$ These t wo hemispheres constitut 
the cerebrum, and it is here tht are located 11 the nerve center 
which govern all our mental acttvities, reason, intelligence, 
'Hill, memory, and the higher emotions and feelings. n2 The 
cerebr1..un is "the seat of consciousness, the interpreter of 
sensations~ the instigator of volunta1~ acts, and it exerts 
a con"~?rolling for ce upon many reflex acts which originate as 
involuntary n3 It is here that Semon locates his ) rotomers 
(v1hatever they may be). 11 Those protomers vvhich in the high 
Vertebrata appear to be chiefly f av.ored ovdng to their osi-
tion ar e situation in · the cortex of t he cerebrma. "4 The cere-
brum can be further analyzed into area s controlling mo to , 
sense, and a s soci ative function s , and in the ~tudy of these 
areas is light shed on the memory problem. 
1 Loeb, CPN, 255. 
2 Kimber and Gray, AAP, 167. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Semon, MNE, 137. 
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The development of the brain is not 
entirely a ITI.8.tter of growth but r ather 
a matter of forming new pathways, i.e., 
nevr connections betvieen synapses, and a 
permanent modification of the synapses 
that are fi.mcti onally active duriJ::g 
various forms of mental activity ~ 
• .. .. babies and i diots have few and shallm-.r 
folds, 'ivhile t he br a ins of men of i ntellect 
are a l v:ay s markedly convoluted .. 2 
I n t he absence of the cerebrwn any animal 
must cease t o be a.l'l association or reaction 
animal and must become a reflex animaL. I n 
other words, all its actions are t hen removed 
from volition, in fact, from consciousnessw 
All responses tha t depend upon memory of 
acquired aqd inherited experience have be -n 
destroyed .. '-' 
There is definite evidence here, then, that the activity of 
mind leaves its traces i n the brain structure v But is it pos-
si ble to lmow more ? The relationship~ of the sensory and 
mo t or areas of the brain can be studied and knovm, but -v ha t of 
the so-called associative areas? 
1 Kim' er 
2 I bid .. , 
3 Ibid .. , 
4 I bid .. , 
Vie do not know by wha t nervous process 
consciousness is evoked, but we do k1.ow 
that it i s restricted t o the cerebrUJl.l, 
espec i ally the association areas. The great-
est differences exi st between this part of 
the brain of man and of animals .. The neurons 
of the associa tion areas differ in their 
structure fr om t hose in other parts of the 
nervous system, but more than thi s i s not 
knovm . Whatever it s cause, con sc i ousness is 
dependent upon nerve impulses , and n1eiTiory 
is rel ated to the :;per manent changes in the 
synapses and pathways i n t he brain .. 4 
and Gray, AAP, 163$ 
164 .. 
170~ 
109. 
So near and ye t so f ar! We can narrmnr t he mind-body probl em 
do~m to t he associat i on areas of the cerebrun1 and see th re 
that mind and body show conclusive evi dence of interaction. 
We can see there hovv t he recall of a:. memory i mage i s possible 
and how injury to the cerebrum can bring injury to memory . But 
t 1e specif ic nature of the rel ationship betvJeen brain andi.. 
o~nsciousness i s still a my stery . Consciousness is conditioned 
by the brain, but it is so much more than a mere effect of a::·: 
physical cause . Rather does the br ai n resembl e a base upon 
whi ch consciousness is erected, a t all and shining tow r. For 
tlhe ultirp.ate why and how of t he brai n-consci ousness r el ation-
ship one must l ook t o the metaphy s ical sy stemsc The realiza~ 
tion and not the explanation of t his r el ationship is all that 
is afforded the empirical observer, and I close this section 
by repeating, i n Ladd Ts ·words, the i mportance of the inter -
r elation of t he two .. 
Just a.s the physical basis of a l l psychic 
l ife reaches its cul mination, puts forth its 
supreme ly 4obl e bloss n in the convo uted hemi -
spheres of the uman ·br a:-i n , so does the life oL 
cons ciousness reach i ts supreme manifestation, 
its cro~ming achievement i n those f or ms of 
consci ousness , ca.rlled acts of knowl edge, which 
depend upon the employrn nt in their inte rit.y 
of t1ese hemisphere s ~l 
1 La.dd_, POK, 1 02 .. 
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(5) The Subconscious. Under the general beading Consciousnes 
I have been examining the nature of consciousness in itself and 
in its relations to the self, to time, and to the brain. These 
relationships can all be said to lie witr~n the limits of con-
sciousness. I now turn attention toward that whose relations to 
consciousness must lie without rather than within, to see whetbe 
there anything may be gathered in for the understanding of 
memory. The approach should be made cautiously and carefully, 
but one can take courage in the words of Hocking. "We need not 
accept uncritically that mother of modern Near-minds, the sub-
conscious, to remember that it has something to c.ontribute to 
our sense of the dimensions of the human self."l 
We certainly do not have any knowing experience of the sub-
conscious. If it could be present to the reflective conscious-
ness, then it would no longer exist as a subconscious. I t is 
necessary to recognize the fact from the beginning that the sub-
conscious, whatever it may be, is but an hypothetical entity, 
an inferential construction as much as is the whole self. The 
datum self alone is immediately given. It bas been pointed out 
that "if consciousness means anything, it is absurd to say that 
that is a part of my consciousness which is not experienced to b 
a:'.- part of it, n2 but an answer to this statement can be made if 
a distinction is allowed between the experi ence of sensation and 
1 Hocking, Art. 1, 210f. 
2 Brightman, ITP, 201. 
.. 
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and perception and those two plus reflection. The whole case for 
a subconscious must stand or fall on the validity of this dis-
tinction. Should it stand, there is no contradiction in speaking 
of the subconscious as an intuited experience of the conscious 
self. 
In the psychological study of attention a fading out from 
the center of attention through constantly more vague objects 
to a fringe where all is indistinct is recognized and accepted. 
The awareness of this diminution of clarity no doubt arose from 
everyday visual experience and from there was pushed out to in-
clude all aspects of attention. But like the expanding rings on 
a pond when a stone has broken through the stillness of its sur-
. face, a concept, when once started, will tend to expand to its 
full possibilities. 
If difference of presentation exist within 
the field of consciousness but beyond the ut-
most verge of the 'threshold of difference', 
we cannot consistently deny the existence of 
any presentations at all beyond - the threshold 
of consciousness.l 
There is, then, at least the possibility of a subconscious 
that is as real as consciousness and, like it, as full of 
contents. For evidence as to the validity of this hypothesis, 
however, it is necessary to turn to the realm of non-cognitive 
experience, which, if we can know it at all, we can only 
1 Ward, PP, 92. 
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Th con t ents of oth are t 1e saii~e, that is, bot \Yorlds ar e 
ui t u throug our images of sense perceptions .. I n a 
strictly empirical sense e s s e is percipi, and t be ac t uc. l 
-_rwrld is j st a subj ectiv ly det rmined as our dream y;orl d. 
T 1en , too, t he f undamenta l lav.~ s of logi c revail in oth . 
Ward . c a.lls at tent ion to this • . TTin f ac t, abs 'd and izarr as 
dream-imagery i s , i t neve r a t any moment entails ove t contra 
d ic tions , thought c ontradictions m -- be im· licit.n1 Yie m y 
r eam, f or exanr.,.l e , that we a r e f yi:r_c through s:pa ce a1 c 
fe e l n othi:rg of natural n ss about it, but then we -J.ov; that 
birds can fly through space, and as l ong as flight i s pos -
sible to some f orms of orga::tic life, there is no rea_ contra-
diction in e -tending the pov:er to a 1 f orms of it .. ~~r o•.-.~n 
most a.Fusin; dream f ound me rurming f or the sub'day one morn-
ing and stopping s l-:;ort v~h en I fo, nd e. 7:hole c ommunity of 
I ndians, complete vvith v:igvrams, c am. fire, and papooses strunO' 
up on ste e l g irders (in the absence of trees ) non cbantly . 
carrying on a peacefu existence on the v:a i ting train l a t-
form of the sub•.':·ay station! Absurd e.n cl ridiculous t o be 
sure, the situation i nvolved i.O r eal con tradiction . On the 
other hand , we never dream of squ are circl es or vrhi te 
negroes. Tbere may be an i mrli.ediate objection that the ' I' 
obj ecti vel y watc hj_ng the ' me ' behave in dreams is an overt 
1 ~ard , PP, 202 . 
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-- both virtual impossibilities -- to observe the che.nging 
activity of the cerebrum during the deep sleep of some sub-
ject-patient, then vve would have a· conclusive answer to this 
question. Until then we are free to let the imaginati on we.nde 
as f~r as Reason will allow in the search f or an hypothesis 
that will fill out the breaks in human knowledge. 
But how i s the individual specifically related to this 
subcon scious, wha tever it may be? Ar t:1e s lves v,'J O stanc'. in 
the hubs of the two ·worlds one and the sarne, partially the 
same» or totally different individuals? By vvay of answer to 
these questions I agree with Eoore that 
Th subconscious is to be thought of 
primarily as the further extension of this 
fringe into what may be called the ultra-
marginal region, containing a nu . ber of 
· instable contents, any of ':'\:hicb may at any 
moment, under normal cond itions, come into 
actual consciousness. From this point of 
view, the subconscious is the potentially 
conscious, and does not, nor mally at least, 
constitute a 'srlf' di stinct from the 
consci ous self. . 
Although there is the possibi lity that the individual may be 
born already a member of the great psychic continuum, to all 
i ntents and purposes he develops and enrichens his subcon-
scious much as he develops and enrichens himself for the 
simple reason that they are both parts of one whole His 
subconscious i s not an independent entity carrying on in-
1 Moore:~ FOP, 205 . 
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cessant warfare with the datum self, but is rather an organic 
part of the whole self, and any warfare that goes on is in the 
same category as the warfare which the active consciousness 
has within it. Were it an independent entity, it would not 
differ appreciably from the traditional soul. As I conceive it, 
it is the equivalent of the factor of potentiality in personal-
istic psychology. The potentiality simply means that what has 
bccured in the experience of the individual may occur again. At 
our present stage of evolution the cases where foreign content 
arises in the subconscious are rare enough to be known as 
'psychic phenomena' and to hold incredulous listeners spell-
bound if well told. But in the vast majority of cases, whatever 
is in our subconscious we have put there, and as long as it is 
there, we may take it out and look it over again s.ome day. Or 
it may venture up of its own accord for some unknown reason! 
There is always the chance that we may go looking for something 
some day and not be able to find it. What then? Has it been 
lost? Perhaps. Midlaid? Perhaps. Changed beyond recognition? 
Perhaps. 
Miss Edgell worries a great deal lest the subconscious 
turn into a store-house. She does not deny the subconscious 
in the sense of present mental processes incapable of de-
tection by introspective analysis, but when it comes to 
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persisting images, she' l l have none of itl1 The chief objection 
to store-house theories of memory is that they add a spatial 
dimension to imagination or ideation which should be conceived 
functi onally, h)t substa·ntially. The objection is a serious 
one in that the contents of our consciousness -- the contents 
themselves and not their r eferents -- are not located i n the 
objective spatial continuum, and if they have no existence in 
the space-world on their first appearance,there is no reason 
to suppose they take up an a biding existence when we are not 
aware ~f them .. But one can object to the functionalists i n turn 
by saying that in their constant emphasis on process they tend 
to l ose sight of such substantiality as makes the process pos~ 
sible. 
Memory is a product of the interaction of mL'1d and body . 
It does not seem likely that any i mage could come before the 
consciousness without some activity on the part Of the cerebral 
hemispheres, whether those hemispheres be stimulated b our 
own. conscious activity, as is usual, or by that of another, as 
yet a very hypothetical possibility. I f a store-house the r e be, 
then the brain is it. Once a brain tissue has been creased , it 
will, as will everything i n the spatial world, tend to f all 
a ga i n i nto the same crease according t o the ·general mnemic 
principle. 
1 Edgell, TOM, 164f. 
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But our ideational contents are not preserved intact in the 
brain. They are a product of physical plus mental factors, and 
it can only be said that the physical factors persist. Accord-
ing to Morgan: 
For emergent evolution what is retained is 
not that which is mentally reproduced but some 
organic precondition (subject, of course, to 
correlation) of its so-called revival, such as 
is afforded by some neural 'en~ram.' There is, 
strictly speaking, no revival tin the etymo-
logical sense) of the memory image as from 
sleep or trance; there is a new birth of an 
image-child like untoi but yet differing from, 
the parental percept. 
Even the analogy of the gramaphone record, 
if it be not pressed too far, is valid. It 
carries down retention to the physical world. 
Sounds, as such, are not retained therein; 
not even physical vibrations are retained. ~~at 
is retained is the complex harmonic f~rm of a 
groove that has been duly registered. 
Before an image can be restored to existence, the mental factors 
must interact with the physical in its recreation, and it is in 
this interaction that the subconscious comes into play, not as 
an entity that preserves our images when we are not using them, 
but as an extension of the self which allows mental activity 
below that threshold of clarity which marks off c·ogni tion from 
other kinds of experience. 
To make of the subconscious a ghost town of past experiences 
is to complicate the memory problem needlessly. This conception 
probably arose as the first explanation of the fact that images 
seem to come to the conscious attention in ready-mad·e ':form and 
could not have really been lo~t to existence at all. But there 
1 Morgan, EE, 129 • 
.... ....... ~.., ,'71'\ 
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is more to the self than meets the eye -- the eye being our 
conscious cognition -- and in pushing out the boundary fences of 
the self so as to inclUde this area of subconscious, of sub-know 
ing 1 activity, we seem to be on the right track toward an expla-
nation of memory which will include both the physical factors in 
learning, retention, and recall, and the mental factor in re-
cognition. 
As for the relationship of the conscious self to -- shall we 
sa:y this conscious plus subconscious self, one cannot be very 
lucid. If the conscious self knew his subconscious self, if he 
could be clearly aware of his fullest dimensions, then it would 
no longer be a subconscious. He might have an experience or an 
intuition of it, but he could not have the clear consciousness 
that is characteristic of cognition. And from the other point 
of view, can this larger self make itself knovrn to the conscious 
self? It is all a matter of degree. 
There would be no point in saying that a 
subject is not conscious of what is not pre-
sented at all; but to say that what is pre-
sented lacks the intensity requisite in the 
given distribution of ·attention to change that 
distribution appreciably is pertinent enough.l 
Ahd lastly, what is the relationship of the subconscious to 
the unconscious? ~~ere does the gray become the black? Where 
does tbe twilight become the dark? 
We cannot fix the limit at which the sub-
conscious becomes the absolutely unconscious. 
The probability is certainly against the as-
1 Ward, PP, 94. 
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sumption that the profoundest sleep carries 
us beyond this limit, and Leibniz may have 
-been right in maintaining that even death does 
not.l 
1 Ward, PP, 94. 
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·cHAPTER IV 
SOME EXPLANATIONS OF MEMORY 
I n the course of the exposition thus far the explanations . 
of memory have been either explicitly discussed or at leas t 
anticipated. It is virtually · impossible to keep separate 2. 
description of f acts and the conclusions to which they point. 
Thus, in a sense, this chapter is needless repetition. And.:: 
yet, though repetition it must in l arge part be, it is not 
needless. The synoptic method follows the three stage advance 
of preanalytic synopsis, analysis, and postanalytic synopsis, 
and it is in this l a st stage that prior concl us ions are 
qualified, if not by difference, . at least bydeeper insight~ 
To a consideration of the adequacy of the soul, of variou s 
physical mechanisms, and of the self in explaining the phe-
nomenon of meinory I nov~' , then, direct attention. 
(l) Soul-psychology. The main thing in considering soul-
psychology is to define just ~ovhat i s meant by soul. If the 
soul is to be a mere material recipient and retainer of images, 
it is but another name for the cerebral hemispheres. fry wa~ 
of explaining memory, it is inadequate since it can a ccm.mt 
only for learning, retention, and recall . It is quite at a 
loss to explain recognition. If, on the other hand, it i s to 
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be the immaterial focal point of reference in all experience, 
if it is to grOVl and develop as that experience develops, if 
it is going to maintain its identity throughout change, then 
it is but another name for the self in its largest possibilitie 
By way of explaining memory, it is the only adequate account 
of the four stages of the remembering process . Soul-psychol ogy 
approaches more and mor adequacy as the concept of soul ap-
proaches this ideal. 
(2) Associationism. Thi s school of thought had its 
origin in David Hume who could find in his consciousness nothin 
but a string of associated ideas. I t gathered in many adherents 
from the ranks of those who would make all psychic life a 
matter of mechanical and rigid stimulus-response, but for all 
its scientific aura, it missed completely giving any explana-
t i on of memory. The laws of a:"Ssociation a:re only descriptions, 
not explanations .. That these are important is admitted by 
Stern when he says that npresent-day psychology ••• must seek 
to include the facts of association in its o~TI anti-association 
istic principle s , "1 but they are not the last word. Recogni-
tion, the essence of memory, cannot be accounted for by any 
description of the associations rhich made possible the recall 
of the recognized imagew As James says in one of his cleverest 
figures of speech, TT The gutter is worn deeper by each succes-
1 Stern, GP, 219. 
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sive shower, but not for that reason brought into contact 
with previous sho·wers .. nl Jmd the Sensationalists, whom we may 
class, I think, with the Nssociationists, fall dovm before 
the criticism of Bm•me who says that in Sensationalism we 
p 
have 11 states of consciousness, but no ·consciousness of sta tes.ff 
A complete explanation of memory cannot be afforded by rigid-
ly mechanical laws even when these l aws are laws of the mind, 
not of matterQ 
(3) Physiological Theori es. Under this one general head-
ing are grouped any and all remaining mechanistic theories of 
memory$ Semon felt that his grand principle of i\Jh1eme was so 
much the greater because of its freedom from any trace of 
teleology .. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The theor-y here developed will be found . 
t-o be based solely upon causality, and to 
require no help from either vitalism or 
teleology.. 3 
Vlhat we are accus tomed to describe as 
'usefulness' in the organic world is there -
fore a product of a t least t wo factors, 
Natural Selection and Mnemic Persistence .. 
Both conceptions are the outcome of biological. 
research, and ar based exclusively on the 
principle of causality, which also suffices 
for the explanation of the inorganic ·world .. 
There is no need for 'final causes' or 'en-
telechies'~ and the like. The appeal to a 
vitalistic principle is rendered superfluous. 4 
Sames, POP, 
B·) vvne, ITP, 
Semon, MI.iJ'E, 
Ibid., 291. 
657. 
• 
14 .. 
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But as long as he characterizes mn~mic causali~f as 'useful', 
he is caught up in the teleology which he thought he had cast 
aside~ "Useful for what? 11 inevitably follov1 s the declarati on 
of utility. The nature of the end, it is true, may be very 
vague .. But an· end is implied nevertheless. 
As a matter of fact, Semon's theory of memory appears as 
inadequate because he, like all the mechanists, completely 
misses or ignores t1e outstanding thing about human memory, 
that is, recognition~ 
But the peculiarity of memory Le.mong 
other repetitive phenomen~ is that its 
kind of repetition is indepen ent of a 
complete repetition of the original con-
ditions.l 
To him, the working of the principle of partial -identity is 
the outstanding thing. Recognition, of course, implies a con-
scious self, and this the mechanists seem stangely eager to 
avoid, although they presuppose it everystep of .their ob-
jective way. As Viard points out, 
There is no question of a choice of 
methods: in every case physiologice.l end 
comparative psychology must fall back on 
the facts and analogies of our O'INTI experi-
ence.2 
Loeb, an a vov1ed mechanist, betray s himself unv;ittingly when 
he says, 
1 Semon, !liNE , 10 .. 
2 Ward , PP, 26. 
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Although we recognize no metaphys ical 
fre e-will, ·we do not deny personal responsi-
bili ty. We can fj_l l tbe memory of the younger 
generation wi th such associations as will 
prevent wrong - doing or dissipation.! 
Memory is nothing but mechanical association, yet t her e is 
room for ethical standards. And apparently nwe 11 are free even 
if the younger generation is not. Very i nteresting! 
Most of the mechanistic t heories of n.emory make the brain 
the rememberer. They point out how reproduction is nothing but 
a pbyscal r~action in the cerebrum~ But to the champions of 
reproduction Bowne says that , nrn no case can cerebral repro-
duction dispense with .:m i ndependent ment al reproduction • • • 
i t is a purely gratuitous bypothesis. 11 2 Such a condemnati on is 
not decisive~ There is the possibility of unconscious cere-
brati on, stim.u _a t ions of whi ch we are not a'Nare , and it might 
even be -oss ible to have creative thought proceed from the 
brain if excited nerve tr~cts were to get side-tracked and 
criss-crossed in rushing forth t o respond . The all important 
argument in .opposit ion to those persons vYho would make brain 
the sole f actor in remembering is that such a theory cannot 
account for Recognition.3 . 
But to say that the brain is not ever-ything does not i mpl y 
that it is not anything. The re is no 'all or nothing' situation 
1 Loeb, CPB, 234. 
2 Bo~ne, IPT, 113 . 
3 Thi s point is made by Bovn1e, !PT, 84; Hoore, FOP, 217. 
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James says that 11 men ory being thus altogether conditioned on 
brain paths, its excellence in a given individual will de pend 
partly on the ntwber , and partly on the persistence of these 
patlls, nl and Bmvne agrees that nthe mental s t at e must be af-
fected by the pbysical.n2 Brain and consciousness are both in-
~olved in the r emembering ~ rocess. Ac cording to James, 
recall • • • is a psycho-phy sical r: he--
nomenon, with both a bodily and a mental 
s ide. The bodily s ide is the functional 
excitement of the tract s and paths i n 
question; the mental s i de is the conscious 
vision of the past occurrence, and the 
bel ief tha t we experienced it before . 3 
Were it not for thi s f actor of recognition, memory could be 
thought of purely as a bodily filn.ction and treated accordingly. 
Recognition, however, i s the very essence of memory, and a 
theory that leaves i t out must be regarded a s inadequa te. Mi ss 
Cal ki ns tells us that 
The most important physiological results 
of memory-method s are the organization , 
multiplication, s trengthening, and unifica-
tion of coP~ections among the different 
brain-centres, and are brought about by the 
systematic development of associati ons .4 
We must be v1i lling to pay our re spects to physiology, to take 
its f indi ngs, and to utilize them to their full value i n v10rk-
1 J ames, POP, 659 . 
2 Bowne, IPT , 18. 
3 J ames , POP, 655. 
4 Cal i ns, ITP, 21 7-.• 
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ing out the relationship bet·w:een brain and consciousness 1 but 
we cannot accept them as the last vmrd in an explanation of 
memory. As Bmvne says, n. v .. ·whatever the significance of 
the brain for memor,y- may be, it does not consis t i n oi ng the 
mi nd ' s rememberingvnl 
(4) Self-psychology. Ivii ss Calkins' s self- psychology pre -
sent s a curious dileruma i n that i t is a t once self-evident and 
objectionable . I n one sense some f orm of self-psychol ogy is 
obviously necessary .. It might be said to be presupposed in all 
rational thought about the mind, for although some very ' ob-
jective' psychologists wash their hands of any me taphysical 
self ru1d concern themselves only with stimul us-response or 
behavior, v1e can ask tJ. em with Mi ss Edgell 1 whether n.. • .. 
ttri a l ', ' success', and 'fail ure', can be given a meaning 
without some a:::ttribution of s ntient experience to the be -
having organism,n2 and they must answer in the negativ • 
Since consciousess of self is the basic f act of mind , it . 
would seem that any scientific study of mind must find its 
origina her • On the oth_er hand , there have been brought out, 
I trust, in the course oftnis thesis, some of the diff iculties 
i nvol ved i n getting hold of the self and examining it. A 
sc ience needs to go slmvl y when its subject matter will not 
1 Bo~~e , IPT, 86. 
2 Edgell, TOM, 27. 
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stay stil or cannot be f01md. ~Koore objects to LUss Calkins 
and her champions by saying that 
The self as 'introspector', \Yhich can 
be found 'not by intros?ection but in 
i ntrospection, is tbe ure 'ego' of meta-
physics, not the 'empirical Me ' of sy-
chology; and we come ack again, for tnc: 
purposes of science, to the only empirical 
s lf there is, namely, t e ' sum-total of 
all me_ tal p __ enomena' .1 
There is a real difficulty here, and I think we can see it a:t 
work tbrougl c.ut James' psychology. He feels tha t he can't 
avoid a self, ard yet on empirical grou1'1.ds he can't find it., 
The result of his struggle, the 'passing t1ought', is but a:~ 
ra-her weak compromis between the two warr ing tendencies. 
Some objections to self -psychol og;J might be eliminated by 
definition~ Psychologists who strongly object to the state-
ment that all our consciousness is self -consci ousness -v,:ould 
find nothing amiss in the statement that all our consciousness 
if self-experience. They are ready to concede that all experi-
ence has its focus vri thin the sentient individual, that any 
experience possible to me vdll be fQL experience, but they do 
not agree that, as subject, I am alv:'ays av;are of IITIJSelf as 
sub ject. Self-consciousness and self- experience represent 
here the 'I' and the 'me' respectively, and the ' I ' for psy-
chology is but an occasional event in the life of the 'me'. 
It is the ' me' which psychol og-,Y vwuld study, and yet it is 
~ Moore , FOP, 81 . 
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unabl to account for the unity which Yc'e find in our experi-
ence without involving the 'I' .. Herein lies the reason why 
an empiri cal p8JCbology of any sort can never be a complete 
a:d exac t science. Herein lies the reason why a psychology 
·which rigidly mainte.ins its divorce from philsooph~,. can give 
us only the description of a :Near - mind. Herein is seen the 
reason why a metaphy sics.l _;_)sychology alone can provide a 
satisfactory psycholog-.f of mind.l 
The self, with the exception of the one datli<'1l self that 
is -..:i thin the limits of the specious prese:nt, it has been 
seen, is a me t aphysical being; hence self-ps-ycholog-y should 
be able to give a satisfac tory account of memory., But then 
se f - psychology varies within itself according to the depth 
and breadth of the concept of self Yihose name it bears, and 
we can expect differences in t h e interpretation of the memo~J 
problem .. I turn fi rst to the form which Miss Calkins sets 
forth. According to it s teachings consciousness i s the self, 
and whatever consciousness disa:pears, as in s l eep, so does 
the self riisappea:r .• The hwuan self is admittedly Hfragrnentary, 
incomplete, interrupted. n2 But, say the self - psychologi.s t s, 
these breaks are bridged over by memory ., The self on awaking 
from sleep that can remember that it is the same self v·;ho 
previously drifted out of consc.iousne ss has undergone no 
serious breakw We find memory e:Kp l aining self - psychology , not 
1 Cf~ Hocking, Art. 1, ~~5. 
2 Brightman, ITP, 196. 
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self -psychology ex~llaining memory! The c apacity for recogni-
tion is, to be sure, the cause of the self, ::tnd memory mus t 
be so rmderstaood in the last analysis. The point here is 
that in a truly organic conception the causae should be com-
prehended within the ~· For 1\Jii ss Calkins' s self -psychology, 
as f a r as the individual is concerned, memory is something 
tacked on from the outside. That the self can remember itself 
on awaking is a very convenient miracle which ke eps recurring 
vii th dependable regularity, but perhaps there is a broader 
form of self-psychology vthich vdll account for memory and 
persoJ.al identity •Ni thout resort to a self which in seven-
league boots picks its way across the islands of consciousness 
which stick p from the s ea of oblivion. 
A self-psychology that can give a satisfactory a ccount 
of memory must be one that defines sel f in a broad enough 'Nay 
to include the subconscious, not as any sort of independent 
organization, as any sort of a sub-self or immediat e relation, 
but as that vague a rea of mental activity lying betv:een 'Nhat 
is b-lown and '.'fhat cannot be knovvn, between the conscious and 
the m1conscious. To make of the subconscious an independent 
sel f is to double the problems of self-psychology and to 
posit a further question of interaction betv:een the conscious 
and subconscious selves, but to make of it the last dimension 
of the v<J11.ole self is to mal{e really comprehensible the fact 
of persona identity. Recognition is only possible v:here 
there is ersonal identit-y. Personal identity is only possible 
where there is direct continuity .. ..ll..nd direct continuity be-
longs only to a self t hat never leaves the psychic s tream, a t 
least not t <J r eturn agai n . Whence t his s l f comes , or vrhere 
it goes, who can say? Birth and death are perhaps the ulti-
mate mysteries and miracles of life ~ The judgment of our 
critical c·onsciousness, moreover, allows only one birth and 
one death t o an individual. Shall '>Ve say that V\'hile the body 
covers a life- span between the limits of one birth and one 
death, t he mind r m1.s through a steady and r apid s er ie s of 
death-rebirth-death- rebirth , etc? I t hardly seems ressonable. 
The animal kingdom af fords no exam) le of a releating bi rth -
death cycle i n the physi cal be ing of one individual , and 
since consciousness is dependent on the i ndividual's physicaJ 
being~ specificall y on the functioning of t he cerebrum, it 
does not seem likely that the sel f go.es through any such 
process of regular regeneration ~ Some may pass by the ani mal 
kingdom and go to the plant kingdom for an analog;J , and there 
it i s true, we do find such a cyc l e occupying reg1.:uar periods 
in the life- span of a single grovdng thi ng . The tree, f or 
example, bursts into nevvness of life in t 'le spr i ng ., Throug 1 
the vmrm months of sunwer i t r ipens and :matures, spreading 
its rich f ol iage out l Uxuriously and abundantly, but V! en 
the wi n_s grow cooler, it wearie s of its burden which has 
now become heavy and tiresome, and i n a final blaze of 
splendor, drops i ts burden and sinks i nto a well-earned res t 
from its l abors . Can 1ve find here a parallel cycle to that 
whi ch our fragmentary sel ves undergo? Decidedly, for we do 
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not admit that the tree is. dead du:cing the •Hinter months. 
Death takes up even a tree but oncee Something has remained; 
something has lain dormant through the period of slumber in 
order to be resent at t1e avvakening, if awakening there be, 
and that something is the intangible thing vre call Life .. 
And w·hat is there in us anal ogous ·to the Life in the 
t ree? The ·whole organic self in the full possibilities of its 
wholeness. It is a metaphy sical entity to be sure, but its 
essence is that of Mind. Miss Calkins's psycbology started 
out in the right direction, but the \•.rar n ings of the empirica l 
kept her from ru1swering in full measure the demands of the 
metapl':rysicl. She saw, in memory, the clue to the real nature 
of Mind, but she misi nterpreted the clue and got only a N ar-
mind . 
Freud and his follmtTers saw the possibilities in the sub-
conscious and made of them a Near-mind much further from Mind 
than Miss Calh:ins had done vrith her Se_f. The- gave it inde-
pemdept existence and peopled it -.,Ji th all sorts of f antastic 
beings, basi ng their hypotheses, for the most part, on psy-
chological cases of multiple personality . But such cases are 
understandable vd tho 1t maki ng t 1e subconscious a chamber of 
horrors. To illustrate I again choose a tree . The normal 
tree sends up one trunk~ but from this tru..Dk s ring many 
lim s ar ranch s. These limbs and brancles are separable 
and disti ct in themselv-.... s, yet vdth the trli!.J.k t e f orm one 
whole -rihi ch is the tree . Tne vvhol self is the main trlmk 
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vrhich sends out many empirical selves~ I: ormally these are all 
abov - the threshold of consciousness and are traceabl and 
co nectable with t main trunk. But it som ti ·aes happens in 
nature that as a young tree is coming through the sur f ace of 
the ground into the l i ght and sunshine, it -finds a rock 
directly in its path .. It then divides and s nds up tv:o tru..Ylks 
instead of on .. Uni ty is still pre-sent, but it lies belov; 
the surface of the earth .. Nee~ I carry th ana.logy furthe ? I 
is to the wort of Morton ~rince on the Co-consc ious tha t we 
can turn for e _i~htelLment on these phenomena~ 
Host of the subconscio s is veiled · in o scuri t- • Of its 
wa s and means vre can o1ly guess. Intimations of it slip into 
consciousness fr om time to tim thro g the medi of memory, 
and from these pieces we try t c nstruct a ·. ictur of th 
v.'hole. And how- true is thi s pic 'CUI' ? As true as Y·:·e believ e it 
to , for aft r all, i s .LOt knowledge basical v a matt r o 
a ith? 
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CHAPTER Y. 
THE f-:JJOWLEDGE PROBLE~!I 
A.. General Considerations 
Genera'ily speaking, Semon and Berg so 1 wo ·l d be straJ:J.ge 
bedfellows, but they might be abl e to hit upon a:-. common ground 
when talking about·:. th influe- ce of the past on action and·_ 
conduct. The principle of mnemic causality and the backv:ard 
h a it- orming drag on t e elan vital both call attention to 
the i mportance of the conditioning of the present y the ast 
in the act ions and reactions of physic a __ o ·ganisms ~ But the 
physical is only ha.lf, and at that the 1 ss im ortant · half, . 
of the influence on this thing called memory. Habit belongs 
to the body, while knowledge belongs to the mind, and we findl 
that k.novrl edge, too, is conditioned by the pa st. 'What we can 
know depends on what we do novr :nov: and have knovm. Just o:rs 
we find it impossi le to conceive of a ha1Di t vd thout t p r-
sisting antecedent repetitions of the a ct to guide it, so 
do we find it impossible to conceive of our present under-
standing wit hout an a ccumulated store of previous l y acquired ~­
knm•:ledge to support it. 
We have seen what habit is, but it still re mains to be 
c:sli:ed, what is lmov: edge? To a..Dswer briefly, knowledge is 
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other possible ways in which we can deal with the data pre-
sented to us .. 
Two possible kinds of lmowledge were implied i n the des-
cription of the knowing process .. The judgment that is made on 
the immediate impulse of feeling seems to differ from the judo 
ment :_ made after a process of considering effects of one judg-
ment on others, and it is the recognition of the differ nee 
between these t'.11lO ways of };:novdng that has given rise to the 
d:i stinction betv.reen intuitive knowledge, or Jr •.x1owledge by ac-
quaintance, and i ntellectua knov:-ledge, or B-...nowle ge by des-
cription .. If a difference betv1een experience and conscio sness 
is to be mah::ttainecl, then the former will be JrJiovr:n by in ui-
tion through acquaintance w .. ile tl e l atter is novm by in-
tuition through d~scription. 
Dewey has emphasized the distinction in his new Logic. 
Knowledge in its strictest and most honori-
fic sense is identical w~th warranted assertion. 
But 11 knoVIledge 11 also m ans understanding, an 
an object, or an act (and its object) that may 
be -- and has been -- called a );lprebension. l 
• .. ., one meaning of to knovl is to under -
stand ...... this meaning is not to be conf sed 
witb warranted affirmation of validity . 2 
The contrast be would mai ntain is not that between immediate 
and mediate knowledge, but between our capacity to becom im-
mediately aware of meanings and there~J use and enjoy the 
1 Dewey, LOG;, 143 .. 
2 . I bid., l53f. 
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world about us -- "Use and enjoyment are the ways in which 
human beings are directly connected with the world about 
them.n1 -- and our capacity to know that world through the 
medium of a system of experimentally verifiable propositions 
about it. He would make experience the art and cognition the 
science of living. 
It would perhaps be better to speak of two approaches to 
the world than of two kinds of knowledge, but since the 
English language affords but one word for the t wo approaches, 
knowledge must embrace both mediacy and immediacy. Yet how 
different really are these t wo ways of knowing? Is it an ab-
solute difference, or one of emphasis? Ladd defines the t wo, 
Immediate judg$ent is judgment with little 
or no clear consciousness of the grounds; 
but judgment, as the recognized result of a 
reasoning process, is judgment with more or 
less of a clear consciousness of its grounds. 
It is the former kind of judgment which is 
prominent in both sense-perception and self-
consciousness; it is the latter which is the 
construction of which scientific knowledge 
demands.2 
and later points out that the difference is really one of 
emphasis. 
Intuitive knowledge does not come at first, 
or grow, without thinking; nor is thinking 
that is not in some sort intuitive, if such 
a: .. ~ thing were at all possible, the avenue to 
more of mediate and indirect knowledge • • .3 
1 Dewey, LOG, 63. 
2 L~dd, POK, 153. 
3 Ibid., 13'7. 
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•• ~ for c ognl~lon itself is impossibl 
vrithout both i nsight and argument, a· d all 
men must both be l ieve 2.nd think i n ord to 
know a t a.ll.l 
If the distinction is not ul t i mate, n v rt 1 1 ss it 
xi ts as a elative one , and one vmnde s wh nc thi s dis-
tincti n a o .. The e>.nsw to this qu stion again can 
so1.:'_0 ?_t and f otm.d i n the nature of the self .. Desc artes' 
cogito , ~ 1ill:ffi wi_l serve as an ill ustration .. It is not 
lL- ly, even for one instant , that D scartes was concerned 
about the sum -oart of his ro osition~ The convic tion 
--
our own xistence i s as intuitive and as i nunediate ~s any t h i ng 
cou d b • A d yet Descartes searc }·e for something with rhich , _ 
lus an ergo, he could preface the sum. Al t hough our intui tion 
i s to all intents and purposes U..Ylsha_table, we are forced by 
th n ee ssities of thought to s ek further j stification fo 
it.. Th twofold approach to lmowledge lies V'i thin t 1e v r r 
consciousness of self. 
I n our consciousness of sel f t1e fe eling f a ctor re-
dominates over but does not crovrd out the i nt 1 ectu~.l f ecto • 
. ot_~ are - resent, and oecause Y\'e 1ave the e:7:· •erience of s lf-
knov.'l cl.g , w- have t e 1{ey to knovd dge of what is no t self. 
• ~ ~ vYhile the knowledge of Self may attain 
an i ntuitive penetration to the heart of Real --
ity, the knovde ge of things remains an ana-
L Ladd, PO_ , 258 . 
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logical interpretation of their apparent 
behaviour into terms of a real nature cor-
responding, in important characteristics, 
to our ovm.l 
Indeed, all that I conceive of as 'intui-
tive,' as doing away with all barriers be-
tween knowing subject and reality knovm, is 
conceived of after the type of my experience 
with myself.2 
But all that you can ever say about any-
thing in the universe must be based upon an 
inter~retation of your own empirical situa-
tion. . 
Granted that knowledge is possible through a varying combi-
nation of intuitive and intellectual processes, and that these 
processes are originally found in and always subject to the 
self-consciousness, is there not something more that is needed? 
Possibly within the specious present and the limits of the im-
mediate empirical situation judgments might be made, but such 
acquired knowledge would die with that present were it not for 
memory. The sense perceptions upon which I pass judgment do not 
drop out of my life as suddenly as they came into it. I change 
them into memory images, so that in this fqra I may r~tain them 
in order to use them later in making new judgments. It is dif-
ficult to attach any real significance to consciousness that is 
not cognitional. It is impossible to conceive of knowledge that 
is not built up on a remembered past. 
1 Ladd, PGK, 227. 
2 Ibid., 199. 
3 MIN, IV, 739. 
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As Ladd puts it: 
Without memory, knowledge of the past would 
be a meaningless phrase; without knowledge of 
the past, through memory, present knowledge both 
of things and of Self would be impossible; and 
growth of knowledge for the individual or the 
race could not take place.l 
Considerations such as these seem to be conclusive evidence 
for epistemological dualism. When Job said, "I know that my Re-
deemer liveth," he certainly felt that whether this Redeemer were 
human or divine, that Redemmer was other than his thought of him. 
Knowledge is always built up through pairs. The thing as known 
is numerically distinct from the thing as existent. In the case 
of sense perception a plausible case can be constructed for 
monism. While Kant was unwilling to deprive things of existence 
beyond their phenomenal appearance, he did maintain that our 
thoughts about them constituted them for us. But when we have to 
deal with .non-sensory experiences and with memories of past ex-
periences, we cannot coherently believe that our thoughts about 
such events are the esse of their existence. As Morgan says: 
It is obvious that if we regard knowledge as 
a practical bu~iness transaction, it can have no 
being in the absence of either contracting party. 
But does it follow that neither . Pa~ty can have 
being in other relations than this vd thin the 
complex business transactions of the world?2 
For one thing, any instance of recognition requires that the sub 
ject -has located his memory image in the spatio-temporal, or at 
least in the temporal continuu.. He ~ remembers a then, yet 
1 Ladd, POK, 122. 
2 Morgan, EE, 36. 
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his present thought cannot coincide numerically with that event 
unless the whole objective time order is to dissolve into hope-
less chaos. The remembering occurs as an event in the present, 
and although a self can transcend the objective time series in 
order to reach the past event to which the present memory image 
refers, it cannot deny that series by saying that the two events 
are one. If history be real, so epistemological dualism. 
There remains still the specific charge of Ladd that 'uncon-
scious knowledge' is a concept impossible even to frame. · The 
phrase, as it stands, is a flat contradiction. The very meaning 
of unconscious is not to know. But there is no such sharp contra l-
diction in 'subconscious knowledge.' 'What this phrase signifies 
is just that which is meant by the relationship of intuitive 
perception to intellectual reflection. Knowledge in and of con-
sciousness is characterized by the intellectual activity and by 
clarity. Knowledge in and of the subconscious, possible because 
the subconscious can be an object of experience and hence in 
some sense knowable, is characterized by intuition and vagueness 
But the one is not less important than the other. Men l i ke 
Bradley pursue the intellectual aspect of knowledge so vigorous-
ly that all emotional coloration tends to evaporate. Men like 
Bergson pursue the intuitive aspect so ardently that intellectua 
clarity becomes dimmed to vagueness. But to pursue extremes ofte £ 
carries defeat in its train. Even as thought and feeling, driven 
by the will to understand, are synthesized in the dialectical 
unity of self-consciousness, so should our knowledge be built 
up from a unity of the demonstrations afforded 
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by the intellect and the insights afforded by the intuition, 
urged ever onvvard by the will to believe. 
B. The Va l i dity of Memory 
Memory gives us lmowledge of the past and thus enables 
us to understand the present. Memory enables us to have know-
ledge of the Self and of things. Memory makes growth of know-
le g possible. In fact, memory is the one and only life-l ine 
that keeps us from sinking do1Jim belov: the ~:vaters of ignorance. 
It is certainly vital, therefore, to know the strength and 
endurance of this line e The question of the accuracy and 
validity of memory becomes one of pr i me i mportance . 
The accur acy of memo!"'J is difficult to ascertain because 
verification and proof depend so much on subjective testimony. 
The original impression is bound to be colored b,y the complex 
of thought·, feelj.ng, and will operating in the person experi-
encing it. Additione.l coloration probably takes place during 
the interval of retention and in the act of recall . As Stern 
points out, 
The f~mction of remem ranc , to pres ~ve 
th individual's past in tbe most appropric>.te 
form for him, necessarily removes the content 
of remembrance to a greater or less distance 
from the original experience.l · 
He claims that there is no one hundred ercent accurate remem-
brance,2 and Miss Calkins, a lthough she does not go as f ar as 
1 Stern, GP, 255. 
2:~ Ibid., 258. 
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that, admits that !!absolutely complete memory is certainly 
ver-J rare . TTl Ward says that TTReminiscence is only perfect 
where obliviscence is nil, that is , where what is remembered 
is just ceasing to be present. n2 Bovme gives a partial acc01.mt 
for the innaccuracy when be says that 11memory never gives all 
the elements of experience, and seldom gives them in. the:: 
exact relations to one another , 11 3 and Dewey adds, 
To affirm that I did a given thing 
yesterday, or that I was ill l a st month, 
is to form an appraisal of a temporal se-
quence. I t differs from any other historical 
reconstruction only in the fact that its 
subject-matter falls within my ovm biography . 
I f the affirmation is grounded, it is mediated 
and hence depends upon. evidential data insti tut-
ed by observations. Llke every mediated out-
come, it is subject W error even though its 
subject n;a tter is something done or suffered 
five mll1Utes ago.4 
If we have to admit that memory is often inaccurate, then 
our life-line begins to sag, and the vvaters boil up beneath us 
But the outlook is not hopeless., for we can agree v:i th Bradley 
that a lthough nthe veracity of memory is not absolutu-, and 
memory itself i s subject to the control of a higher criterion 
• ~ .. and if vve are to think at all, we must postulate that 
reason is in principle infallible and is t1e ul timate judg 
of its own errors.lr5 We must presuppose the validity of reason 
1 Calkins, ITP, 210. 
2 Ward, PP, 352. 
3 Bmme, IPT, 271. 
4 Dewey, LOG, 223. 
5 Bradley, ETR, 374. 
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c .. Belief 
I n the earlier part of this thesis memory was located be-
tw en sense perception and imagination, and V!hile the images 
of sense perception were distinguished from those of memory 
and t he imagination qualitatively, no criterion was proposed 
by v:bich the qualitatively different images could be distin-
guished in the functionings of memor-y and imagination. The 
only criterion l"fhicb can be sugg ested is the one of belief G 
HvEe made use of it. 
But as it is cer·ce:un there is a great dif-
ferenc etwi xt th simple conception of the 
existence of an object, and the belief of it, 
and as this difference lies not in the Darts 
or composition of the idea which v~e co cei ve; 
it follo·w , that it must lie in the manner 
in ·which we cone ei ve it .1 
It is the criterion set up by J oll_n Stuart Mill~ 
The difference betvieen belief and mere 
imagination, is the difference between re-
cognizing something as a reality in nature 
and regarding it as a mere thought of m.J.r 
ovm.2 
We find it also in James ~ 
Remembrance i s like direct feeling; ~ts 
object is suffused wi tb a 1:varmth and inti -
macy to which no object of mer perception 
ever attainse3 
1 Hume, THN, Book I, Part III, Section VII .. 
2 Edgell, TOM~ 70. 
3 James, POP, 239 . 
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What, t l e , is be ief? Can •t:e lr.now more about the criterion 
which is to decide what is f act anc_ 'N:ha t is f ancy among our 
wealt1 of images? 
I believe .. Th se t v:o words can preface a s t a t ement which 
car :i."' ie s vii th it t e authori ~r of a l a st court of a·opeal or 
they can apologize in advanc f or the timid suggestion of a 
person not prepared to say, I ill1ow~ They can s i gnify a grip 
on obj ectivity or the instability of mere subjectivity. Aware 
of this De, y ~rites, 
But belief is a doubl e-barreled word. 
It is used objectively to name vrha t is 
believed~ In this sense, the outcome of 
inquiry is a settled o jective state of 
affairs, so settled tl a t '.'Ie are r eady to 
act upon it, overtly or in i nagination 
• ~ • But in popular usage, belief a so 
means a :personal matter , so!:.11ething that 
some human bein[· entertains o ho_ds ; a 
oti tion , '!I hie ·· under t be influence of 
psychology, is converted into the notion 
that belief is merely a mental or psy-
chical state . l 
The double meaning of the word doe s exi st, but De'c"Iey overshoots 
the mark in his a ttempts to rescue it from the real m of the 
(solipsi stic) me_ta_. Belief i s a conscious a titude and a s 
such is an affair of the minde Indeed, it is the crucial a t -
titude for t he lmoviledge pro lem. s i nc e there every hy ot he sis 
reaches its ultimate test The most intricate syst m of 
expl anation is but an empt-y- f a:Llure to anyo:me v.-ho, after exam in 
1 Dewey, LOG, 7 .. 
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in.g it~ cannot believ it to be true~ _!\by possi l e c iterion 
of truth ca · give only probability, n ver certainty, and 
w ere th re ar e d grees of pro a ility~ one can proc ed only 
on f ait in re l ative degrees of truenes s . Th s does an indi vi-
uai. us his emotional nature as a potent f a ctor at the vital 
point for intellectual mastery of the world. That elief i s 
emotionally conditioned seems hardly to need confi mation . One 
can find expressions of the f act almost at random$ 
An idea assented to feel s differ ent from 
a.::: ficti tious idea that the f ancy a lone pre -
s ents t o us • • .-
• • • belief is more 
se1sitive, than of th 
our natures . 2 
roperly an act of the 
cogitative part of 
The products of our thinkin ,. are be l iefs 
which function as def inite det rminers of 
conduct. N'c belief is an act in the making~ 
1 if en a belie.f as become thoroughly emotion-
a·l ized, it becomes a cor viction-provoking 
l oyalty $ A belief, to e effective, must b 
ti d up to t e emoti01 s .... 3 . 
Bv 'belief t we. oftenest intend to mark 
those mental atti t1 de s i n vrhich judgment 
i s pronounce U..'1der t 1e i nfluenc of feel -
ing, but with little or no satisfactory r · -
cognition of its j stifying grounds, and 
generally, therefore !I ·.-dth a~~ weaker degree 
of conviction.4 
I s this emotione.l concli tioning a .liabi lity or an asset? On t he 
one side t here is dane;er that i tel ectual activity will create 
a"'.knowledge structure which its creator is :perfectly indif-
1 Hume, THN, Bk., I, Pt~ I II , Sec. VII. 
2 I bid., Pt~ IV, Sec. I . 
3 Vaughan, GP, 473 ~ 
4 Ladd, POK, 234 w 
ferent towards in his everyday living. On the ot er hand t here 
t 1ere is the wors e dc:mg er that a person may allow the will to 
believe to invol ve him i n such contradictions as will make of 
his mental life a complete chaos. 
Liability or asset? The answer i s ne ither and both , ".vhich 
is to say that belief needs further qualification. Towards 
this end, Bright man prefixes to belief the requirement "7rell-
grounded." Dewey prefers to speak of "war ranted aesertibility. 1 
Others have their ovm particular terms . What is shared by all 
those vrho w·ould so qua ify be i ef is a recognition of the 
truth t hat a mature i ·1di vidual must think and act a s a whol e 
i ndividual and ·:1ot as a being 'Nho denie s or destroys one part 
of his nature for thesake of another part .. To t he eff orts of 
the i ntellect at graspi ng the meaning of things we must bring 
our f aith in :their trueness, but those efforts must be the 
best possible i n order to earn the support of a t rusting 
naturee A reason wi thout f a ith is an empty castle. A faith 
without reason is a castle built on shifting sands. 
Belief is an -a t t itud-:; that crrri es with it conviction, 
but the conviction is only one of degree .. Degree, moreover, 
requir s an i deal relative to v:hich it r~ceives its posit i on 
on the scale, and t hat ideal is Reason. Vife see evidence of 
rationa i ty armmd us very day, but long with it, we see an 
abm:1dance of that which i s irratio 1al . There is serious cause 
at times to daunt t ' e validity of Reason, but to reject it 
brings our whole knowledge structure tumbling about our heads. 
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If we are to build, '<"Ve must build on faith in Rea son and cor-
relate our knowledge acquisiti ons according to its rinci· les. 
Do we know because we believe, or believe because v.re 
know? Herein lies the distinction between intuition and intel-
lect writ l arge .. Neither answer can be exclusively ri ght., 
Ra ther does the solution l ie in the growinG dialectical unity. 
of the t wo, and the proportions i 'l which faith and reason 
shall influence the maturhig Personality must probably be 
determined by eac 1 individual for himself~ 
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THE ROLE OF :MEr!IORY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONALITY 
I n t he history of t he t heat er there have al ways been · 
thos vrho demanded the stellar roles in all producti ons, vrho 
have wanted the op ortunity to portray those characters in 
whvm the t me of the drama was f ocused , who have wanted to 
be the ~ of an artistic performance. There have also been 
those v:ho served backstage, who devoted t he ir energi es toY:'ard 
hol ding the vrhole thing together , who have been contented to 
be the causae of a succe ssf ul presentation. It i s to the latte 
group that memory belongs in the ver unfol ding drama of the 
Universe •. 
Jl..nd it is a dramaw In its r gularity and spontaneity, in 
its advances an its frustr ations , in its necessities and its 
contingencies, 'fho can f ai l t o find infinite material for 
int llectual sti mulation, ethica i ns irati011,, aes t he tic 
sati s f act i on! The individual , VJhen first becomine; aware of 
this great drama, takes frig t at its s i ze and withdraws into 
the loneliness of his ovm indi"~..;iduality. But the vrall s of his 
retreat are ma e of glassw He cannot shut out that vhich ever 
presses in on him, and out of his forced wi tnessing of the 
drama com~s the real izat i on t at he is not m~rely a spectator 
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but himself a part of it~ V!itJ th i s rea ization doe s t e 
r tr at ecome a a dvance . He is no longer a m- r i ndi vidual 
bu t a s cia l individual. To be aware of his m'Vn part is to 
become aware of the parts of others, and in genuin ly co-opera 
tiv participation in the great adventure is the pr oblem of 
l oneliness transcended. 
I s aid a t the outset that it was the answers with v:hich 
we met the problems that made us persons. I s Personality, 
then, a series of truths about Reali~r? There is distortion 
in characterizing it in such a static way-,. Per sonality is a 
princi· 1 of grovl'th r a ther than a symbol of achievemen t. It is 
a method rather than an entity. While not implying that the r e 
is no achievement in grovrth, no t angible results vri t h in the 
proce s s of investigation, the philosopher of persona lity 
stresses the idea that the goal is of more vw rth them the 
gain. In hj.s ovrn self -experience he has found e!hange to per-
mea te everything, and yet i s there a constant amidst a ll _the 
chang in the form of the integrating act i vity of mind. Is it 
str ange that he shou d attempt to Q~derstand all reality in 
those terms which alone make his own experience intelligibl e, 
that he should see the v-.rhole a s a macrocosm of l'rhich his ovm 
experience is a microcosm! 
Regardless of w_ at contribution he makes to the -·->!hole, 
the individual is the hero of t he drama whic:.1 i s hi s m':n l ife. 
I t is hi s Self who has the stella r role. But the s elf is de -
ndent f or its very- existence on t h e funct i oni hg of me -n.ory. 
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To translate this role from life of an individual to a meta-
physical system in which all reality is interpreted in terms of 
self-conscious experience is to gain a greater conception of 
the importance of the mnemic in all existence. It is to find 
new signs of purpose at work in the Cosmos. In the words of 
Morgan, "It may be said, then, that through resultants there is 
continuity in progress; through emergence there is progress in 
continuity. rrl It is, further to gain intimations of an immortali 
ty that promises creative progression rather than merely end-
less perpetuation. Because we have· direct access to the past 
we are its richer heirs, but because we can anticipate and plan 
we are not its slaves. The role of memory, in either its indi~ 
vidual or universal possibilities, must always be one of ser-
vice, but it is the servant without whom the master would 
perish. 
1 Morgan, EE, 5. 
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